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Abstract
This commentary on article #19 of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's Discourse on 
Metaphysics is for the purpose of promoting the understanding of  Leibniz on the role of 
teleology in physics.  Understanding Leibniz on final causes is crucial to understanding his 
overall natural philosophy.  If one approaches Leibniz with a bias regarding either final causes 
or protestant Christian theology, such that they ignore these aspects of Leibniz, such a person is 
in danger of completely misunderstanding this philosopher.  Leibniz is a mix of natural 
philosophy, mechanical physics, and protestant Christian theology.  The rationale behind this 
study is to cause the student of philosophy to consider a somewhat ignored side of Leibniz 
which stems from his  combination of two politically incorrect words in academics today, 
“intelligent” and “design”.  Both these words are found in article #19.  Both of these terms are 
employed in concert with the Christian idea of God, a combination which is highly charged in 
academics today, and most politically incorrect.  To address the political incorrectness of this 
combination of terms, however, is to engage in the understanding of what it meant to think and 
argue in seventeenth century Europe.  To wrestle with these terms in article #19 therefore, is to 
wrestle with those positions which caused great tension in early modern culture.   The approach 
taken for this work is a line by line exposition of the text, unearthing the arguments involved 
and those philosophers who made them.  Once into this particular text, article #19 turns out to 
be enormous in its scope of Leibnizian thought.  Its subject matter mirrors  the thinking of 
Leibniz, and is background material for other projects Leibniz was involved in at the time, such 
as the laws of motion in optics.  The significance of the work to the discipline is that Leibniz, 
iii
one of the most intellectually gifted men in human history, no less the co-discoverer of the 
calculus, argues that reality is an intelligent design created by a loving person  who only wants 
to be loved by the creation in return.  This puts him at odds with pure mechanists in his day, and 
it puts him at odds with many in philosophy today.  For all those in philosophy who argue that 
there is no reason for reality existing, at least not as it does, Leibniz provides a very clear 
counter argument.   Leibniz's point in article #19 is that there is a place for end purposes in 
calculating the laws of nature, and that those who dismiss end purposes do so for insufficient 
reasons.
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Introduction
In this essay I will comment on article #19 in Gottfried Leibniz's Discourse on 
Metaphysics.  My thesis for this essay is that a proper interpretation of article #19 
involves the context in which the discourse is written, opposing philosophical viewpoints, 
and three Leibnizian themes;  final cause, intelligent design, and machinery.  In some 
respects article #19 mirrors Leibniz's entire philosophy.  As each individual substance 
mirrors the universe, both past, present, and future within its very being, so the words of 
#19 reflects the entirety of Leibniz's thinking within their words.  
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 – 1716), co-discoverer of the calculus, refiner of 
the principle of least action, and a champion of teleological applications for the laws of 
physics in optics, says that physical reality is the product of an intelligent design by a 
loving person, God.  For Leibniz there is a sufficient reason why there is something rather 
than nothing.  There is also an end purpose towards which physical reality, the machine, 
moves.  Understanding article #19 assists the philosopher and student of Leibniz in 
understanding this position.  He does not present his position within any formal system or 
major work.  There is no Leibnizian system in terms of a major work in which Leibniz 
carefully spells out his position.  Leibniz is a reactionary thinker.  He spends his 
philosophical career reacting to positions of other thinkers such as Descartes, Spinoza, 
Gassendi, and Hobbes.  Interpretations of his thinking  must be gleaned from personal 
correspondence, unpublished essays like Discourse on Metaphysics, articles published in 
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Acta Eruditorum, and his only published book Theodicy.
Leibnizian scholarship is continually challenged by the newly edited and 
published  works by Leibniz which bear upon previous interpretations.  Compound this 
with the fact that Leibniz changed his mind about things during the course of his career, a 
feature of not having a formal system, and fresh new interpretations are a constant feature 
in Leibnizian scholarship.  This commentary includes one of these translation features, his 
Systema Theologicum  written in the same year as Discourse on Metaphysics, 1686.  
This work has a particularly significant impact on interpretations of the  Discourse on 
Metaphysics.  Both are written for the same personal audience, and, therefore, both must 
be interpreted within the context of the other.  
What is unique about interpreting #19 is that its subject matter and heading “The 
Utility of Final Causation in Physics” is not currently in favor within academic 
philosophical scholarship.  It was not in favor at the time Leibniz wrote it either.  A 
movement was underway in his time to abandon final causes as a legitimate mode of 
explanation  for the physical world.1   The young Leibniz decided at the age of fifteen  to 
join the movement and  abandon substantial forms  in favor of the new mechanism.  He 
understood the rightness of those discoveries in the scientific community, which were 
more accurately describing the workings of the machine, and he embraced the new 
understanding.  In his early years, however, he discovered that not every physical 
phenomenon could be explained  mechanically.  As a result, he will come to the position 
before his middle years that there are just some things that must be explained  both
metaphysically than mechanically.  As a result, he will come to embrace both.  
1 Clatterbaugh, Kenneth.  The Causation Debate in Early Modern Philosophy  1637 – 1739 . Routledge: 
New York, N.Y., 1999,  p.  4 
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This embracing of both will be spelled out in his Doctrine of the “Interpenetration 
of Causation”, where two sets of laws will operate simultaneously with each other, 
affecting the same phenomena without adversely affecting one another.  The laws of 
motion in essential causation will operate alongside the final cause for the movements of 
physical bodies.  This doctrine is firmly set in the mind of Leibniz at the time of the 
writing of Discourse on Metaphysics.  In article #19, one will find this doctrine firmly in 
play  but never mentioned.  God operates physical reality like a machine according to 
mechanical laws, and for his glory.  Leibniz's opinion is that unless one sees reality this 
way, one's understanding is incomplete.
In interpreting any specific passage in the history of philosophy, a knowledge of 
the context within which the author writes is required.  In the case of article #19, the 
context is specific within the intelligent design argument of articles #19 – #22 and 
general within Discourse on Metaphysics as a whole.  By “Intelligent Design” Leibniz 
means that physical reality is a creation by an intelligent agent.   Upheaval in European 
thought and culture surrounded Leibniz's thinking as culture boiled over in disputes  
regarding science, religion, and politics.  The scientific dispute turned on the transition 
from Aristotelean substantial forms to mechanism based on laws of motion as introduced 
by Descartes, Leibniz, and Newton.   The religious dispute was between Protestants and 
Catholics, and the political dispute was between nationalism and Christendom.  These 
three disputes overlapped depending on  issues and circumstances, and the European 
citizenry was  caught up in the battles which ensued.  Leibniz was a diplomat who 
worked towards positions of mutual agreement between disputing parties in all three of 
these areas.  
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Causation in physics was one of the major scientific issues of Leibniz's day.  
Article #19 is a statement about the metaphysical application of the laws of physics.  
In #19 Leibniz attacks those who deny the utility of final causes in physics.  He  
calls them “the new philosophers”.  It is not that their understanding of essential causation 
is in error.  His argument against them is that their rejection of final causes leaves them, 
and those who buy into their philosophy, with an incomplete explanation of the machine.
The two main “new philosophers”  that occupy his thinking are Descartes and 
Spinoza.  However, a proper and complete interpretation of #19 also includes individuals 
named in lists in other works before the writing  of Discourse on Metaphysics.   Leibniz 
engaged them all in his career, but their participation in this work pertains exclusively 
to the prejudices of his audience, Antoine Arnauld. 
For Leibniz, reality is a “machine”.  Though he never uses the word in article 
#19, he gives three examples which illustrate how the machine works;  animal structure, 
the eye, and the prince and the cannon.   Animal structure  is a scientific issue in
Leibniz's day.  He sees it as one of the evidences of the design of an intelligent 
creator.  The example, however, which best illustrates his purpose for writing #19 is the 
human eye.  It is God, he will say, who has created the eye.  Why?  For seeing, of course. 
.  
It is what he says about the workings of the rays of light when they reflect off of the 
eye that greatly enhance the significance of his illustration in #19.  He says that 
the rays of light behave according to two sets of laws, mechanical, and teleological.  
They move  according to laws of physics and  for the end purpose of eyesight.  Leibniz 
will argue this position because  he will demonstrate to himself that rays of  light, though 
they have infinitely many paths to take, always take the easiest path.    They never vary.  
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Subsequently, by always taking the easiest path, rays of light fall under the concourse 
of a loving person who thought it wise to create beings with eyesight so that they might 
behold his glory when  he presented himself to mankind in the personage of Jesus Christ. 
This is the point of the final article #37.  Leibniz finishes #19 with the illustration 
of the prince and the cannon.  God has created a machine.  The machine did not create 
itself, nor does it run itself.  God both creates and runs the machine so as to accomplish 
the purpose of his self-revelation to, and his personal relationship with,  those who love 
him.   
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Chapter One:  The Context For Article #19
 A proper interpretation of Discourse #19 involves the context in which Leibniz 
wrote.  First, Leibniz wrote within the context of his intelligent design argument in 
articles #19 - #22.  In the work as a whole,  the words “intelligent” and “design” are 
mentioned in #19, but not before, and in  #22, and not thereafter.  Second, Leibniz wrote 
within the context of Discourse on Metaphysics as a whole.  This work is part of a “one 
two punch” combined with the Systema Theologicum. Together they are designed 
to assist Catholic/Protestant reunification.  Third, Leibniz wrote within the context of the 
political, religious, and scientific turmoil of early modern Europe.  The “Thirty Years 
War” had ended in 1648,2 but the political, religious and scientific differences between 
factions boiled during Leibniz's lifetime.  Fourth, he wrote toAntoine Arnauld, a Roman 
Catholic theologian, philosopher and mathematician.  The first letter in the Leibniz-
Arnauld correspondence contains only the thirty seven major headings.  The entire text of 
Discourse on Metaphysics never found  its way into Arnauld's hands.
Articles #19 - #22 contain Leibniz's entire intelligent design argument within 
Discourse on Metaphysics work as a whole.   Discourse #20 is about “overly materialistic 
philosophers” with Phaedo 96b – 99c as the backdrop.  In this Platonic discussion, the 
question is about how things come to be, and whether or not an intelligent agent is the 
2 Parker, Geoffrey.  (Editor).  The Thirty Years War, 2nd Edition.  Routledge:  New York, N.Y., 1997, p. xii 
“It is often claimed that Samuel Pufendorf , the eminent seventeenth century jurist and historian, was the 
first to claim the term 'The Thirty Years War' to describe the series of conflicts which ravaged Europe 
between 1618 and 1648.” 
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first cause and the designer of reality.3  Socrates says to Cebes, “I heard someone reading, 
as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, and saying that it is Mind that directs and is the 
cause of everything.  I was delighted with this cause, and it seemed to me good in a way 
that mind should be the cause of all.”4  This passage, the first two chapters of Genesis, 
and the first chapter of Romans,  served as the philosophical and theological textual 
sources for Leibniz's argument.  Discourse #21 is about the wisdom of the designer and 
the mechanical workings of bodies.  Leibniz says, “Now, since we have always 
recognized God's wisdom in the details of the mechanical structure of some particular 
bodies it must also be displayed in the constitution of the laws of nature.”5  Discourse 
#22 contains Leibniz's explanation of the cause of the machine, “by final causes and by 
efficient causes.”6  He says, “Both ways are good and both can be useful, not only for 
admiring the skill of the Great Worker, but also for discovering something useful in 
physics and in medicine.”7
Discourse on Metaphysics as a whole, is an article of Christian faith written by a 
natural philosopher who happens also to be a protestant theologian.  God is an “absolutely 
perfect being” who acts perfectly metaphysically and morally.8  Reality consists of 
individual substances that express the whole universe in their very being.  The events of 
individual substances, their circumstances,  and the whole sequence of external things”  
3 Ariew, Roger and Daniel Garber (Editors).  G.W. Leibniz, “Philosophical Essays”.  Hackett Publishing 
Co.: Indianapolis, In., 1989, p. 53  In footnote #85, Ariew and Garber quote Leibniz's marginal note: 
“The passage from Plato's Phaedo where Socrates ridicules Anaxagoras, who introduces mind, but does 
not make use of it, is to be inserted.”
4 Cooper, John.  The Complete Works of Plato.  Hackett Publishing Company:  Indianapolis, In., 1997, p. 
84
5 Ariew, Roger and Daniel Garber (Translators).  G.W. Leibniz, “Philosophical Essays”,  Hackett 
Publishing Company:  Indianapolis, In,  1989, p. 53    
6 Ariew and Garber, p. 54
7 Ariew and Garber, p. 54
8 Ariew and Garber, p. 35
7
are “included” in their own notions.9  All individual substances, whether thinking or non-
thinking, exist as a result of design.  The  design of the machine is for the purpose of 
thinking substances to dwell in a loving relationship with God in and through Jesus 
Christ.  The “ends” of creation is the revelation of the kingdom of God in and by Jesus 
Christ.  Leibniz says, “Jesus Christ has revealed to men the mystery and admirable laws 
of the kingdom of heaven and the greatness of the supreme happiness that God prepares 
for those who love him.”10  
Leibniz wrote within the political, religious and scientific context of early modern 
Europe.  Politically, the Germany of  Leibniz was divided into numerous small states, and 
was undergoing a slow transition to nation statehood.  Religiously, Europe was torn 
between Catholics and Protestants, and scientifically, Europe was torn between the 
causation of  Aristotelean substantial forms and the causation of what will come to be 
known as Newtonian mechanics..  
Leibniz addressed Discourse on Metaphysics to a French Roman Catholic 
theologian named Antoine Arnauld (1612 – 1694).11 Arnauld was a Jansenist, who, 
because of the Jansenist/Jesuit controversy, was forced to go into hiding in Paris for 
twenty years.  Some time after this, he was forced to leave France and settle in Brussels 
where he spent the last sixteen years of his life.   It is doubtful that Leibniz was writing to 
the right Catholic to aid him in church reconciliation.  Even if Leibniz was to have been 
9 Ariew and Garber, p. 40 – 41  
10 Ariew and Garber, p. 69
11 In their work G.W. Leibniz, Discourse on  Metaphysics and Related Writings.  Manchester University 
Press:  New York, N.Y. ,  1988, p. 1, editors Martin and Brown say “The system that is first expressed in 
the Discourse owes much to the inspiration of Malebranche.  Leibniz once conceded that it is to him that 
I owe my foundations in this subject'  (from Mathematische Schriften von G.W. Leibniz, C.I. Gerhardt, 7 
Vols., Berlin and Halle, 1849 – 1860, ii 299).  Leibniz admired much in Malebranche's style of 
philosophical writing and the Discourse is influenced by the form, style and content of Malebranche's 
Treatise of Nature and Grace.”
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successful in persuading Arnauld, it is doubtful whether or not Arnauld could have 
persuaded the Roman church hierarchy to seriously consider Leibniz and his Discourse 
on Metaphysics as thirty-seven reasons for unification.
The correspondence between Leibniz and Arnauld was a “three cornered affair”.  
The intermediary was “Ernst, the landgrave of  Hessen-Rheinfels.”12  Leibniz wrote to 
Arnauld in hopes of gaining a sympathetic hearing from a Roman Catholic “nobleman” 
concerning his views.  Leibniz thought that this would help him in his quest to unify 
Catholics and Protestants.  The Leibniz-Ernst correspondence, in which the Leibniz – 
Arnauld correspondence took place is 1680 – 1693.13  Leibniz wrote Ernst in 1680 
summarizing The Sincere and Discreet Catholic concerning church reunification.  
Protestants, Leibniz argues, should “seek with all their powers to overcome the obstacles 
to reunion with the Catholic church, and Catholics should “remove the abuses within the 
church that were associated with the division of Christianity.”14  This was the main 
objective with which Leibniz wrote to Ernst.15  
On February 11, 1686, Leibniz writes Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels the first letter in 
what is to become the Leibniz – Arnauld correspondence:  
Being at a place lately for several days with nothing to do , I wrote out a short discourse 
on metaphysics  on which I should be very much glad to have the opinion of Mons.  
Arnauld.  For the questions in regards to grace, in regards to the relation to God with 
created beings, in regards to the nature of miracles, the cause of sin, the origin of evil, 
 the immortality of the soul,  ideas, ets., are discussed in a way which seems to  offer 
new points of approach fitted to clear up some great difficulties.  I enclose here with a 
summary of the articles which it contains, as I have not had time to make a clean copy 
of the whole.  I therefore beg your serene highness to send him this summary, requesting
him to look it over and give his judgment on it.  For, as he excels equally in theology
and philosophy, in erudition and in power of thought, I know of no one who is better fitted  
to give an opinion on it.  I am very desirous to have a critic as careful,  as enlightened, and 
12   Sleigh, R.C. Leibniz and Arnauld, A Commentary on Their Correspondence.  Yale University Press: 
New Haven, Ct., 1990, p. 15
13 Sleigh, p. 18 – 19 
14 Sleigh, p. 19
15 Sleigh, p. 19
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as open to reason as Monsieur Arnauld, being myself also a person the most disposed in the 
world to submit to reasoning.  Perhaps Monsieur Arnauld will not find this outline whole 
unworthy of his consideration, especially since he has somewhat occupied in the examination 
of these matters.  If he finds obscurities, I will explain myself sincerely and frankly and if 
he finds me worthy indeed of his instruction, I shall try to behave in such a way that he 
will find no cause for being dissatisfied on that point.   I beg your serene highness to 
enclose this with the summary which I am sending and to forward them both to Mons.
 Arnauld.16
With this first letter Leibniz includes “the summary”, which is the list of thirty-seven 
article headings.  Leibniz's hopes of gaining a sympathetic Catholic audience are dashed  
as Mons. Arnauld indeed finds “this outline whole unworthy of his consideration.”  
Arnauld's first letter to Ernst in reply to Leibniz indicates this.  Article #13, entitled 
 “Since the Individual Notion of Each Person Includes Once and For All Everything 
That Will Ever Happen to Him,  One Sees It The A Priori Proofs of the Truth of Each
 Event, or, Why One happened Rather Than  Another, But These Truths, However 
Certain, Are Nevertheless Contingent, Being Based on the Free Will of God or of 
His Creatures, Whose choice Always Has Its Reasons, Which incline Without 
Necessitating”   
is particularly impossible for Arnauld to bear.  So, on March 13, 1686, he wrote his 
initial reply to Leibniz through Ernst.
I have received Mons. the metaphysical thoughts which your highness sent me from Mr. 
Leibniz as a witness of his affection and his esteem for which I am very grateful to him.  
But I have been so very busy ever since, that only within the last three days have I been 
able to read his missive.   And at the present time I have had such a bad cold that all I can 
do now is tell your highness in a couple of words that  I find in his thoughts so many 
things which frighten me  and which if I am not mistaken almost all men would find so 
startling that I cannot see any utility in a treatise which would be evidently rejected by 
everybody.17
Arnauld then proceeded to express his dismay at #13, and later on in the letter compared 
Leibniz to one of Augustine's correspondents who wanted to become a Christian but who 
had unacceptable views.  Arnauld's initial assessment of Leibniz's ideas in Discourse on 
Metaphysics is that Leibniz should concern himself with the salvation of his soul, and 
forsake his unacceptable beliefs.18
16 Leibnizcorrespondence.www.class.uidaho.edu/.../texts/Leibniz%20-%20Correspondence.htm
17 Leibnizcorrespondence.www.class.uidaho.edu/.../texts/Leibniz%20-%20Correspondence.htm
18 Leibnizcorrespondence.www.class.uidaho.edu/...texts/Leibniz%20-%20Correspondence.htm
10
Discourse on Metaphysics should be interpreted in the context of other Leibnizian 
works which have a bearing on the subject matter of Discourse #19.  Some of these works 
are A Unitary Principle of Optics, Catroptics and Dioptrics (1684), Systema 
Theologicum (1686), Specimen Dynamicum  (1695), and Tentamen Anagogicum (1696).  
In order to interpret Leibniz's design argument properly in Discourse on Metaphysics as a 
whole, and in #19 in particular, one must understand Leibniz's theology.  For Leibniz, all 
of reality is by design, and the end purpose for which reality exists is Jesus Christ. 
 Systema Theologicum explains this.  In his doctrines of God, Creation, and 
Christology, Leibniz says first that God is an intelligent being of perfection who creates, 
preserves, and governs the order of intelligent beings for his glory.19  Second, God is a 
loving person who only wants to be loved by intelligent beings in return.20  Third, by 
God's perfect order of things, man has fallen,21 but Christ has come to redeem man.22  
Fourth, according to Leibniz, man falls in sin because of 'concupiscence', animal nature.23 
Fifth, God has instituted revelations which declare his manner of governing intelligent 
beings as well as “the entire machine of the universe.”24  Sixth, Leibniz says that Christ is 
the logos of God, the rational principle of the universe made flesh.25 Leibniz says that 
Christ is the one person in the trinity who took upon himself the nature of man.26  He did 
19 Russell, William (Translator).  A System of Theology, Burns and Lambert: London, England, 1850 p. 2, 
written by Gottfried Leibniz
20 Leibniz, A System of Theology, p. 3
21 Leibniz, A System of Theology, p. 6
22 Leibniz, A System of Theology, p. 7
23 Leibniz, A System of Theology, p. 7
24 Leibniz, A System of Theology, p. 10
25 Leibniz, A System of Theology, p. 16;  One of the definitions of “logos” is “rational principle of the 
universe.” See Lidell and Scott's  Greek-English Lexicon.  Clarindon Press:  New york, N,Y,, 1979, p. 
416, λογος is “I. The word by which an inward thought is expressed...II The inward thought or reason 
itself.”  Christ is God's reason, or rationale, for creation; I,e, the rational principle of the universe. 
26 Leibniz, A System of Theology, p. 16
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so for the expiation of the human race.27  The time for Christs arrival on earth was pre-
ordained.28  Christ was sinless.29  He was “the anointed of the Lord, or the King or 
messiah, the restorer of the human race foretold by the oracles of the prophets.”30  Christ's 
purpose in coming is to die for the sins of all mankind.31  Seventh, the born again 
Christian loves God in return by keeping the law, which is all God wants in the first place. 
Leibniz says, “Nevertheless, it pleased God to ordain as the law man's redemption, that 
it's benefits should extend to all who, having been born-again in Christ, by the grace of 
the Holy Ghost, should elicit a filial act of faith and love....”32  For Leibniz, physics
occurs for the purpose of man's knowing and loving God,  through Jesus Christ.
That charity or love, which is a divine virtue, consists in our Loving God above all 
things; and seeking in hm our sovereign good;  and, therefore, we are to love him, not 
only for the benefits he bestows on us, but also for himself, and as our last end. 33
Leibniz's Systema Theologicum sheds valuable interpretive light on Discourse 
on Metaphysics.  God is a loving person of intellect and will who creates to love, and be 
loved by his creation.  Christ is the end purpose for which the creation moves.  This is 
what Leibniz means in the last article where he mentions Christ and machine in the same 
thought.
The ancient philosophers knew very little of these important truths;  Jesus Christ alone 
has expressed them divinely well, and in a manner so clear and familiar that the coarsest 
of minds have grasped them.  Thus his gospel has entirely changed the course of human 
affairs;  he has brought us to know the kingdom of heaven or that perfect republic of 
minds which deserves the title of City of God.,  whose admirable laws he has disclosed 
to us; that, caring for sparrows, he will not neglect the rational beings which are 
intimately more dear to him., that all the hairs on our head are numbered; that heaven and
earth will perish rather than the word of God and what pertains to the economy of our 
salvation;  that God has more regard for the least of the intelligent souls than for the whole 
27 Leibniz, A System of Theology, p. 16
28 Leibniz, A System of Theology, p. 16
29 Leibniz, A System of Theology, p. 16
30 Leibniz, A System of Theology, p. 17
31 Leibniz, A System of Theology, p. 19
32 Leibniz, A System of Theology, p. 19
33 Leibniz, A System Of Theology, p. 30
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machinery of the world;  that we must not fear those who can destroy bodies but cannot
harm souls., because God alone can make souls happy or unhappy; and that the souls of 
the just, in his hand, are safe from all the upheavals of the universe, God alone being able 
to act upon them; that none of our actions are forgotten, that everything is taken account 
of, even idle words or a spoonful of water well used;  finally, that everything must result
in the greatest welfare of those who are good;  that the just will be like suns, that neither 
our senses nor our mind has ever tasted anything approaching the happiness that God
prepares for those who love him34. 
Article #19 is part of Leibniz's overall philosophy of the machine workings towards 
that end which is humanities confrontation with God in Christ by two sets of laws 
stemming from essential and final causation.
34 Ariew and Garber, p. 68
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Chapter Two: Leibniz on Final Causation
In order to properly interpret Article #19, an understanding of Leibniz on final 
causation is essential, and  there are four basic areas of Leibnizian thought that must be 
considered in this matter;  one, the definition of final causation itself and its 
relationship with essential causation,  two,  the influence of Plato and Aristotle,  three, 
Leibniz as a mechanist who never abandoned Aristotelianism completely and  firmly 
believed in the operating of physical reality to be of a mechanical nature,35 and  four, the 
blending of theology, Plato and Aristotle, and mechanism together to form his Doctrine 
of “Interpenetration of Causation”.  In this doctrine, essential causes and final causes are 
related without interfering with one another.  The laws of motion in physics operate 
mechanically and with an end purpose.  Article #19 should be understood within this dual 
functionality in causation.
Leibniz says that final cause has a “utility”, or useful role to play in physics.  This 
is in regards to body on body causation.  Final causation is the ends purpose for which a 
thing moves.  For example if a rock falls, scientists and philosophers in Leibniz's day ask 
what caused it to fall.  The primary question was one of essential causation.  If another 
rock struck the rock in question, then that rock is the essential cause of the subject rock's
35 In the introduction to The Labyrinth and the Continuum page xviii and xix, translator Richard Arthur 
says, “According to his later testimony Leibniz first began to doubt the scholastic philosophy he had 
learned in school as early as 1661 when, at the tender age of fifteen, he was in his first year at university 
of Leipzig.  “...by the time Leibniz left university in the late 1660s he was firmly committed to finding a 
rapprochement between Aristotle and the moderns.  Like his teachers Jacob Thomas and Erhard Weigel, 
he maintained that an Aristotelean account of substance was not only compatible with the new 
mechanistic physics of Descartes, Galileo, Hobbes, and Gassendi, but essential for its proper function.” 
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falling.  One might ask what caused the first rock to strike the subject rock and cause it to 
move? In answering this, scientists and philosophers quickly become mired in the issue of 
infinite regress of causation.  In this case they are either challenged with the problem of 
having no explanation for causation because they choose to adopt a position which denies 
a first cause, or they are challenged to define the first cause, which leads to problematic 
issues of metaphysics and theodicy.  Leibniz says that the speed of the rock's fall can be 
calculated according to essential causes involving mechanical laws of motion.  His point 
in article #19, however, is that there is a usefulness in this physics question to involve 
final causes in the calculation.  This is because the velocity of the rocks fall is telic in 
nature.  This forces Leibniz to confront the issues of metaphysics and theodicy in which 
he argues that God creates the best of all possible worlds in which such laws of force and 
motion exist.  
Leibniz is a mechanist who says that the subject rock's fall can be totally 
explained in terms of physical laws of motion.  At the same time, however, he thinks that 
the end purpose for which the rock moves plays a utility role.  Direction of a bodies 
motion will convince Leibniz that a metaphysical explanation is the only explanation for 
this physics phenomenon.  Bodies always move in accordance with the easiest path. By 
1695 essential and final causes will play an equal role in explanations of the laws of 
nature, and this will be Leibniz's position until his death.  
The influence of Plato on Leibniz is found in Phaedo and Timaeus.  In Phaedo
95e-96b and 97b-c Plato says, 
And Cebes said, 'There is nothing that I want to add or subtract at the moment.  This is what 
I say.'  Socrates paused for a long time, deep in thought.  He then said, 'this is no unimportant 
problem that you raise Cebes, for it requires a thorough investigation of the cause of generation 
and destruction.  I will, if you wish, give you an account of my experience I these matters.  
15
Then, if something I say seems useful to you,  make use of it to persuade us of of your position.  I 
surely do wish that, said Cebes.  Listen then, and I will Cebes, he said.  When I was a young 
man I was wonderfully keen on that wisdom which they call natural science, for I thought it 
splendid to know the causes of everything, why it  comes to be,  why it perishes and why it exists.
Nor can I any longer be persuaded that when one thing is divided, this division is the cause 
of its becoming two, for just now the cause of becoming two was the opposite.  At that time 
it was their coming close together and one was added to the other, but now it is because one
is taken and separated from the other.  I do not any longer persuade myself that I know why
a unit or anything else comes to be or perishes or exists by the old method of investigation, 
and I do not accept it, but I have a confused method of my own.  One day I hear someone 
reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, and saying that it is mind that directs and is 
the cause of everything.  I was delighted with this cause, and it seemed to me good, in a way, 
that Mind should be the cause of all.  I thought that if this were so, the directing mind would 
direct everything and arrange each thing in the way that was best.36   
In Timaeus 27d – 39c and 48e – 57d, Plato argues as a teleologist that mechanics is 
incapable of giving adequate explanation of physical reality.37  Leibniz employed both of 
these Platonic positions in his philosophy;  one, that not everything can be explained by 
mechanics, and two, that mind is a causal agent in physical reality coming to be.
The influence of Aristotle on Leibniz is found in Metaphysica, Physica, and De 
Partibus Animalium.  In Metaphysica XII 6 Aristotle insists that movement requires a 
cause.  He said, “Yet, if we follow the theologians who generate the world from night or 
the natural philosophers who say that 'all things were together', the same impossible result 
occurs.  For how will there be movement is there is no actual existing cause?”38  
Concerning God and theology, Aristotle discusses the existence of gods and the mythical 
tradition handed down to them by their forefathers in Λ81074bI-10.39  He teaches that all 
movement requires a mover and even multiple movers in Λ71072a21-26 and Λ81074a15-
36 Cooper, John (Editor).  The Complete Works of Plato.  Hackett Publishing Company:  Indianapolis, In., 
1997, p. 84
37  Cooper, p. 1234 – 1260;  This is Hankinson's assessment on p. 127 of Cambridge Companion to  
Aristotle.
38 McKeon, Richard (Editor).  The Basic Works of Aristotle.  Random House:  New York, N.Y., 2001, p. 
878
39 Barnes, Jonathon.  (Editor).  Cambridge Companion to Aristotle.  Cambridge University Press: New 
York, N.Y., 1995, p. 104
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16.40  They are incorporeal, partless and indivisible substances.  They cannot cause 
movement by striking something.  They cause movement like an object of desire causes 
another object to move towards it in Λ71072a26-32.41 In Λ9 Aristotle's unmoved movers 
are good and they think.  Here we see four influences on Leibniz. One,  God is 
incorporeal and partless.  Two, God does not cause anything to move by striking it. Three, 
God is good, and four, God thinks.
In Physica II 3 Aristotle says that reality contains four causes.  The material cause 
is “that out of which a thing come to be and which persists.”  The formal cause is “the 
form of the a archetype, i.e. “the statement of the essence”.  The efficient is the primary 
source of the change or coming to rest.”  The final cause is “the sense of end”, “that for 
the sake of which” a thing is done.”42  In physics, Aristotle is not concerned with what 
causes what, but with the basic structural pattern of the world.43  The focus is about what 
causes things to change.  For Aristotle, physical reality has two parts, the heavenly bodies 
and the world below.  In the heavens perfection reigns and nothing ever changes.  Change 
occurs in our world below.44  For Leibniz, individual finite substances do not cause 
movement, yet he observes the changing world.  Aristotle's theology influences Leibniz in 
that God does play a role in the continuing unfolding of the world order, but God is 
neither the creator of that order nor its continuing cause.  This concept is not the divine 
artificer of Plato where a supreme mind causes movement.  It is a non-intentional 
teleology.45  Objects move towards that which they love. 
40 Barnes, p. 104
41 Barnes, p. 104
42 McKeon, p. 240 – 241 
43 Barnes, p. 107
44 Barnes, Jonathon (Editor).  Cambridge Companion to Aristotle.  “Philosophy of Science”, R.J. 
Hankinson, contributor,  Cambridge University Press:  New York, N.Y., 1995, p. 117 - 118
45 Hankinson, p. 127 – 128 
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Aristotle's teleology is not intentional or aimed at establishing a design 
argument.  “Rather, it involves seeing particular physical processes (the maturation of a 
tree or infant, for instance)  as being in a sense explanatorily basic (8 PA 4 10687a 19-
23).46  It can be argued that Leibniz gets his idea for the doctrine of Interpenetration of 
Causation from  Aristotle's following comment in De Partibus Animalium I 639b11 – 
642b4.   Here Aristotle weds efficient and final causation.  
The causes concerned in the generation of the works of nature are, as we see, more 
than one.  There is the final cause and there is the motor cause.  Now we must decide 
which of these two causes comes first, which second.  Plainly, however, that cause is 
the first which we call the final one.  For this is the reason, and the reason forms the 
starting point, alike in the works of art and in the works of nature.  For consider how 
the physician or how the builder sets about his work.   He starts by forming for himself 
a definite picture, in the one case perceptible to mind, in the other to sense, of his end – 
the physician of health, the builder of a house – and this he holds forward as the reason 
and explanation of each subsequent step that he takes, and of his acting in this or that 
way as the case may be.  Now in the works of nature the good end and the final 
cause is still more dominant than in works of art such as these, nor is necessity a factor 
with the same significance in them all;  though almost all writers, while they try to
 refer their origin to this cause, do so without distinguishing the various senses in which
 the term necessity of used.   For there is absolute necessity, manifested in everything 
that is generated by nature...47
Leibniz was a mechanist who wed Aristotelean causation with the new 
mechanistic philosophy.  In the Aristotelean philosophy physics is explained in terms of 
accidental and substantial form.  The new philosophy explained things in terms of size, 
shape and motion.  Further, the new philosophy stressed that size, shape and motion were 
to be understood in terms of geometric equations as they are applied to tiny particles that 
make up large bodies.48  Leibniz thinks that the Aristoteleanism of his day and the new 
physics are compatible.49  In his letter to Jacob Thomasius in 1669, Leibniz says, “I 
cannot better show this possibility of reconciling the two than by asking any principle of
46 Hankinson, p. 128
47 McKeon, Richard (Editor).  The Basic Works of Aristotle.  Random House:  New York, N.Y., 2001, p. 
644
48 Jolley, Nicolas (Editor).  The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz.  Cambridge University Press:  New 
York, N.Y. , 1995, p. 271 – 272 
49 Ariew and Garber, p. 271
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Aristotle which cannot be explained by magnitude, figure and motion.”50  This wedding 
of efficient causation with final causation becomes for Leibniz the doctrine of 
“Interpenetration of Causation” as he words it in Specimen Dynamicum (1695):
In general we must hold that everything in the world can be explained in two ways:  
through the kingdom of power, that is, through efficient causes, and through the kingdom 
of wisdom, that is, through final causes, through God, governing bodies for his glory, like 
an architect governing them as machines that follow the law of size or mathematics, 
governing them, indeed,  for the use of souls, and  through God, governing through his 
glory souls capable of wisdom, governing them like a prince, indeed like a father, through 
laws of goodness or moral laws.  Those kingdoms everywhere interpenetrate each other 
without confusing or disturbing their laws to that  greatness obtains in the kingdom of 
power at the same time as the best in the kingdom of wisdom.51
This law reaches its maturity in The Monadology, where Leibniz says, 
“Since earlier we established a perfect harmony between two natural kingdoms, the 
one of efficient causes, the other of final causes, we aught to note here yet another 
harmony between the physical kingdom of nature and the moral kingdom of grace,
that is, between God considered as the architect of the mechanism of the universe, 
considered as the monarch of the divine city of minds.”52
The development of the Doctrine of Interpenetration of Causation can be traced 
throughout Leibniz's career.  He was both a mechanist and a teleologist.  He believed that 
the world operated according to the design of God the designer.  Reality, in his opinion, 
is an intelligently designed machine.  In his position that reality is a product of an 
intelligent creator, he takes his place among those thinkers who have held, to various 
degrees, the same position:  Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Kepler,, 
Newton, Paley, Descartes, and Einstein.53
50 Loemker, Leroy (Translator and Editor).  Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Philosophical Papers and  
Letters”, D. Reidel Publishing Company: Dordrecht, Holland, 1970, p. 95
51 Ariew and Garber, p. 126 – 127 
52 Ariew and Garber, p. 224;  Jeffrey McDonough, in his essay Leibniz's Two Realms Revisited”  (Nous 
42:4 2008, p. 674) says, “The peaceful coexistence of both realms, Leibniz maintains, reveals itself 
through various harmonies found throughout his metaphysical system.  One such harmony holds 
between 'the physical realm of nature, and the moral realm of grace;  that is, between God considered as 
designer of the machine of the universe, and God considered as monarch of the divine city of minds 
(Mon 87/FW 280).” 
53 The character Socrates argues for intelligent design in Philebus 28d – 29a. Plato argues for intelligent 
design in his work Laws Book X and Timaeus 28a – 29a.  Aristotle's unmoved mover thinks in 
Metaphysica Λ 7 20 – 25.  Aquinas argues for an intelligent designer in his fifth proof for God's 
existence where he says “Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed 
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Of those philosophers and theologians who have argued in favor of the intelligent 
design argument, Leibniz is unique with his doctrine of interpenetration.  The 
interpenetration of causation between essential and final causes is how God intelligently 
designed the world.  He believed that God creates by force and he also believed that 
“force is the essence of matter”.54 The combination of living force and minds in matter is 
the interpenetration of efficient and final causation.  Things have the nature to move 
according to their own power and according to those end purposes established by God.
Leibniz's doctrine of Interpenetration of Causation begins in the early Leibniz, a 
period which extends from Leibniz's youth to the 1670s.55  In this period he mentions his 
doctrine in various forms of intelligent design discussion involving God as intelligent, 
essential causes, final causes, and the Christian doctrine of creation.  The first place is 
Dissertation on the Art of Combinations (1666).56 It is also found in Theological Writings 
to their end; and this being we call God.” see  Baird, Forrest and Walter Kaufmann (Editors).  From 
Plato to Derrida.  Fourth Edition.  Prentice Hall Press:  Upper Saddle River, N.J., 2003,  p. 353 
Augustine says, “...the world by itself, by the perfect order of its changes and motions, and by the great 
beauty of all things visible, proclaims...that it has been created and also that it could not have been made 
other than by god ineffable and invisible in greatness, and...in beauty”, see Ayala, Fransisco J.  Darwin 
and Intelligent Design.  Fortress Press:  Minneapolis, Mn., 2006, p. 1.  Ayala, p. 3, also says that Paley 
believed that the human body was evidence of God's creative design.  Human physiology is the sole 
place where Descartes recognizes teleology.  Newton argues for God's intelligent design in the scholium 
generale of his 1713 Principia.  See Schonburg, Christoph.  First Things.  “Reasonable Science, 
Reasonable Faith,”  No. 172, April 2007, p. 21  Einstein said to a young girl, “Everyone who is seriously 
involved in the pursuit of science becomes convinced that a spirit is manifest in the laws of the universe 
– a spirit vastly superior  to that of man, and one in the face of which we with our modest powers must 
feel humble.”  see  Isaacson, Walter. Einstein.  Simon and Schuster:  New York, N.Y., 2007, p. 388
54 Loemker, p. 1
55 Christia  Mercer puts Discourse in the middle period, see Jolley, Nicolas (Editor),  The Cambridge 
Companion to Leibniz.  Cambridge University Press:  Cambridge, U.K., 1995;  Mercer  and R.C. Sleigh, 
Jr. (contributors) “Metaphysics:  The Early Period to the Discourse on Metaphysics”, p. 67;  Loemkr 
divides Leibniz's career into fourths, beginning with Mainz and Paris, 1666 – 1676, which puts 
Discourse into a later period.  See Loemker, Leroy (Editor) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz “Philosophical  
Papers  and Letters.  2nd Edition, D. Reidel:  Dordrecht, Holland, 1970, p. ix 
56 Loemker, p. 73 – 74; Here Leibniz begins with establishing for himself that God exists.  Interpenetration 
of Causation is a phenomenon which exists by God and for his glory, so it is necessary to establish the 
existence of God. 
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Related to the Catholic Demonstration (1668 – 1670),57  Selections from the Paris Notes 
(1676),58 On a Method of Arriving at a True Analysis of Bodies and Causes of Natural 
Things (1677),59  and Letters to Christian Philip (1679 and 1680).60
Leibniz’s doctrine develops in his middle period, a period extending from the 
1680s to the 1690s.  In this period he mentions his doctrine in A Unitary Principle of 
Optics, Catoptrics, and Dioptrics in “Acta Eruditorum” (1682),61 On The elements of 
Natural Science (1682 – 1684),62  Letters to Arnauld (1687), 63 Letters of Mr. Leibniz on a 
General Principle Useful in Explaining the Laws of Nature Through a Consideration of 
Divine Wisdom;  To Serve as a Reply to the Father Malebranche (1687),64  Critical 
Thought on the General Part of the Principles of Descartes (1692),65  Specimen 
Dynamicum (1694),66  Tentamem Anagogicum (1696)67 and Second Explanation of the 
New System (1696).68 
In the development of his doctrine Leibniz begins with establishing the existence 
of God and moves toward the interpenetration of essential and final causation.  In 
Dissertation on the Art of Combinations he provides a proof for God's existence in the 
57 Loemker, p. 109 – 112 
58 Loemker, p. 158
59 Loemker, p. 173;  Here Leibniz says that since not everything can be explained mechanically , that 
“What cannot be explained in this way will here be referred to the action of some perceiving being.” 
These , for Leibniz,  are the beginnings of minds which move according to end purposes.
60 Loemker, p. 272
61 In A Unitary Principle of Optics, Catoptrics, and Dioptrics, (1682) Leibniz says that rays of light move 
according to principles of final causes.  See Jeffrey McDonough's translation in 
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rutherford/Leibniz/unitary-principle.htm, p. 3
62 Loemkr, p. 280
63 Ariew and Watkins, p. 269
64 Loemkr, p. 351
65 Loemkr, p. 387
66 Ariew and Garber, p. 126 – 127 
67 Loemkr, p. 475;  Leibniz opens this essay with “I have shown on several occasions  that the final 
analysis of the laws of nature leads us to the most sublime principles of order and perfection, which 
indicate that the universe is the effect of a universal intelligent power.”
68 Loemkr, p. 460
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midst of a section of axioms demonstrating motion and on God being the mover of 
things that move.69  In section three, article seven, he connects mathematics with 
metaphysics.70  
Since number is therefore something of great universality, it rightly belongs to metaphysics,
if you take metaphysics to be the science of those properties which are common to all classes 
of beings.  For to speak accurately, mathematics (adopting this term now) is not one discipline 
but small parts taken out of different disciplines and dealing with the quantity of the objects 
belonging to each of them.  These parts are rightly grown together because of their cognate 
nature.  For as arithmetic and analysis deal with the quantity of beings, so geometry deals 
with the quantity of bodies, or of the space which is coexistent with bodies.  Far be it from us, 
certainly, to destroy the social distributions of disciplines among the professions, which have 
followed convenience in teaching rather than the order of nature.71  
Here we see the Platonic influence on Leibniz, because, for Plato, number disappeared 
into the forms.72  Plato also believed in the demiurge as designer of reality and the 
producer of motion.  This influenced Leibniz's thinking.  In this particular passage he 
mentions geometry as well as mathematics.  In the later stages of the doctrines 
development, Leibniz will employ his skill in geometry to establish final causes in optics. 
In the time between this passage and Discourse on Metaphysics the doctrine will develop 
in the following way:  from the mind of God will emerge the mathematical and 
geometrical formula which will cause rays of light to function mechanically, and function 
according to the end purpose for which God has harmoniously established.
Leibniz begins his career with an embracing of mechanism and a shunning of final 
causes, and reverses himself on final causes, thereby embracing both.  Two years after 
Dissertation, in Catholic Demonstrations, Leibniz writes that he started out to discover 
the workings of nature “without an incorporeal cause.”73
69 Loemkr, p. 73 – 74 
70 It should be noted that Leibniz included logic with metaphysics; see Loemkr, p. 84 
71 Loemker , p. 77
72 For Plato, there is the idea of a number and then there is the number itself in reality.  For example, there 
is oneness and twoness, and then there are actual ones and twos;  see Wedberg, Anders.  Plato's  
Philosophy of Mathematics.  Almquist and Wiksell: Stockholm, Sweden, 1955, p. 54 – 57 
73 Loemker, p. 110
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At the beginning I readily admit that we must agree with those contemporary philosophers
who have revived Democritus and Epicurus and whom Robert Boyle aptly calls corpuscular 
philosophers, such as Galileo, Bacon, Gassendi, Descartes, Hobbes, and Digby, that in 
explaining corporeal phenomena, we must not unnecessarily resort to God or to any incorporeal 
thing, form or quantity (Nec Deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus inciderit)  but that so far 
as can be done, everything should be derived from the nature of body and its primary 
qualities – magnitude, figure, motion.74 
Here is his early reference to the real issue, that of body on body in physics.  Each of 
these men held that final causation had no part in the causation of movement between 
corporeal bodies.  So, early on, as scholarship acknowledges, Leibniz is an advocate of 
mechanism.  He falls in line with the thinking that reality functions solely according to 
mechanical principles, and that without the aid of God.
Then he runs into the problem of the question “why?”.  Leibniz comes to the 
position that a full explanation of a body cannot be done without this question being 
asked, even in mechanics. He ponders the question of why a particular body is “two feet 
long instead of three, or square rather than round?”75  Mechanics, he says, fails to answer 
this question.  Sometime prior to 1666 – 1668 , therefore, Leibniz lost faith in the new 
physics to fully and completely explain physical phenomenon.  For him, bodies are 
explained fully when all the mechanical laws of motion are observed, along with other 
related scientific laws, and then teleologically.  He comes to the conclusion that some 
bodies are two feet long instead of three because they are supposed to be.  An intelligent 
agent decided so.
Leibniz comes to conclude that bodies do not define themselves within 
themselves.76  What he becomes convinced of is the inadequacy of the atomists, and the 
early moderns who agree with them, to fully explain  movement.   He comes to believe in
74 Loemker, p. 110
75 Loemker, p. 110 – 111 
76 Loemker. p. 111
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the superior explanation of movement being that of a mind controlling it all, namely God. 
It is in Catholic Demonstrations  that Leibniz mentions this movement being a 
harmonious one.77  Harmonious movement emanates from the mind of God.
But since we have demonstrated that bodies cannot have a determinate figure, quantity, 
or motion, without assuming an incorporeal being, it readily becomes apparent that that 
incorporeal being is one for all because of the harmony of things among themselves, 
especially since bodies are moved not individually by this incorporeal being but by each 
other.  But no reason can be given why this incorporeal being chooses one magnitude, 
figure, and motion, rather than another, unless he is intelligent and wise with regard to 
the beauty of things and powerful with regards to their obedience to his command.  
Therefore, such an incorporeal being will be a mind ruling the whole world, that is God.
In Paris, in 1676, Leibniz notes that one, God exists, that two, he has now 
established the principle of the “harmony of things”, and that three, all possible things 
that would exist do exist.78  Further, he says that things exist as they are out of necessity, 
which is a precursor to the principle of sufficient reason.  He then makes a statement 
about God that demonstrates where he will take “interpenetration”.  Leibniz understands  
that God is a person of will.    He says, “God is not a kind of metaphysical being, 
incapable of thought, will and action, as some make him.  This would be the same as to 
say that God is nature, fate, fortune, necessity or the world.  But God is a definite 
substance, a person, a mind.”79  A full ten years before Discourse on Metaphysics,  
Leibniz thinks that a loving person of intellect and will is behind the laws of nature.
In the middle period when he develops his doctrine, Leibniz employs geometry 
in optics to make  his point that final causation has a role to play in physics.  This 
thinking has it roots in these notes in Paris.  Before he pens the words about God as a 
person of will, he states that “Furthermore, since some things exist, and certain things do 
not exist, it follows that there must exist most perfect Elements of a Secret Philosophy of 
77 Loemker, p. 112
78 Loemker, p. 157
79 Loemker. p. 158
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the Whole of Things, geometrically demonstrated....”80  Before he leaves that section,  
Leibniz reiterates his thinking about God in the face of those who depersonalize God.  He 
says, “It must be shown that God is a person, a substance, an intelligence.”81 
The utility of final causation in physics is the end purpose for which a loving 
person of mind and will runs the machine.  This machine runs according to mechanical 
laws, but it also runs according to  moral laws.  It runs, as Aristotle would have it, towards 
that which it loves.  A loving mind runs the machine so that other loving minds can love 
Him in return.  That is the usefulness, or the utility, of final causes in physics.
80 Loemker, p. 158
81 Loemker, p. 158 
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Chapter Three   “Leibniz and the New Philosophers”
A proper interpretation of article #19 involves Leibniz on the opposition to 
final causation in physics.  The text of # 19 begins with his reference to this opposition.
Since I do not like to judge people wrongly, I do not accuse our new philosophers, who 
claim to banish final causes from physics.  But I am nevertheless obliged to confess that
the consequences of this opinion appear dangerous to me, especially if I combine it with  
the one I refuted at the beginning of this discourse, which seems to go so far as to eliminate
 final causes altogether,  as if God proposed no end or good in acting or as if the good were 
not the object of his will.  As for myself, I hold, on the contrary, that it is here we must seek  
the principle of all existences and laws of nature, because God always intends the best and 
most perfect82.
From this passage two questions emerge.  One, who are the “new philosophers”, 
and two, what is their new philosophy?83  From Discourse on Metaphysics itself it can be 
discerned that at least two of the new philosophers Leibniz has in mind are Descartes and 
Spinoza.84  In his other writings, however, Leibniz gives us two lists of names of 
philosophers with whom he  disagrees.  One such list is found in Catholic 
Demonstrations.  These are the “corpuscular philosophers” who have, to Leibniz's 
dismay, “revived Democritus and Epicurus.”  This list includes Galileo, Bacon,85 
Gassendi, Hobbes, Descartes and Digby86.  The other list is found in his letter to 
82 Ariew and Garber, p. 52
83 Israel argues that the new philosophy is Cartesianism.  See Israel, Radical Enlightenment, Philosophy 
and the Making of Modernity, p. 35
84 Ariew and Garber, p. 52;  In footnote #84 Ariew and Garber say that “The 'new philosophers' Leibniz 
has in mind include Descartes and Spinoza, who explain everything mechanically and reject final 
causes.”  
85 According to Garber, both Galileo and Bacon were adherents of atomism.  See Cambridge Companion 
to Descartes, Garber, p. 287
86 Loemker, p. 210;  Arthur is of the opinion that Discourse on Metaphysics is an attempt at reconciliation 
between “The new philosophy of Descartes, Mersenne and Gassendi” and Aristoteleanism.  See Smith, 
Justin.  The Problem of Animal Generation in Early Modern Philosophy.  “Animal Generation and 
Substance in Sennert and Leibniz”,  Richard Arthur, contributor,  Cambridge University Press:  New 
York, N.Y. , 2006,  p. 147 
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Thomasius.  This list contains a group of philosophers who have “dismantled
philosophy.”  They are Baghemin, Patricius,87 Telesius,88 Campanella, Bodin, Nizolius, 
Fracastori, Cardan89, Galileo, Bacon, Gassendi, Hobbes, Descartes, Basso,90 Digby 
Sennert, Sperling, Derodon, Deusing,...91
Article #19 is about the “utility” of final causes in physics.  From these two 
lists, and from earlier material in Discourse on Metaphysics, the new philosophers 
Leibniz has in mind are those who deny final causes to various degrees.  The new 
philosophy is either  Cartesianism, corpuscular atomism, or both.  In Leibniz's thinking 
the key issue for both of these philosophies is their relationship with final causes.
Corpuscular philosophy is the atomism of the early modern era in terms of  the 
mechanics of matter and motion.  “Boyle opens his account 'of the origins of qualities' 
with a statement of the fundamental principles of the corpuscular philosophy   According 
to this theory (1) matter is an extended, impenetrable substance which is the same for all 
corporeal objects, and (2) motion is the primary accident of matter and the efficient cause 
of all other accidents of matter”92  As Boyle sees things, the new philosophers are 
atomists who leave God out of the equation.  
87 According to Petkovic and Hengster-Movric, in the abstract of their essay “Patricius' Phenomenological 
Theory of Tides and It's Modern Relativistic Interpretation”, Synthesis Philosophica, Vol. 21, No. 2, 
December 2006, p. 255,  Patricius had tried to explain the variety of phenomena of tides in various seas 
as part of his model of the universe (28th and 29th Books of Patricius' Pancosmia).  He correctly 
recognized the moon and the sun as two general causes of tides (formulated by Kepler as the lunar 
theory of tides) but failed to see the role of gravity.” 
88 Telesius was a materialist who believes that “the soul was simply matter in its finest and most mobile 
state.”  see Baltz, Albert.  The Journal of Philosophy , Psychology and Scientific Methods.  “Dualism 
and Early Modern Philosophy II”,  Vol. 15, No. 9, April 1918, p. 229 
89 According to Serjeantson, Cardano held that concerning the language of animals, “Animal 'words' are 
formed not meaning in the soul,...but only by custom.” see Serjeantson R.  Journal of the History of  
Ideas.  “The Passions and Animal Language,  1540 – 1700” , Vol. 62, No. 3, July 2001, p. 432
90 According to Garber, Basso was an atomist,  See Cambridge Companion to Descartes; Garber, p. 287
91 Loemker, p. 93
92 O Toole, Frederick.  Journal of the History of Philosophy, “Qualities and Powers in the Corpuscular 
Philosophy of Robert Boyle”, Vol. 12, No. 3, July 1974, p. 298
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When I speak of the corpuscular, or mechanical philosophy, I am far from meaning 
with the Epicureans, that atoms, meeting together in an infinite vacuum, are able in 
themselves to produce the world, and all of its phenomena;  nor with some modern 
philosophers, that supposing God to have put into the whole mass of matter such an 
invariable quantity of motion,  he needed do no more to make the world, the material
parts being able by their own unguided motions, to  cast themselves into such a system 
(as we call by that name:) but I plead only for such a philosophy, as reaches but to 
things purely corporeal, and distinguishing between the first original of things, and 
the subsequent course of nature, teaches concerning the former not only that God gave 
motion to matter, but in the beginning he so guided the various motions of the parts of it, 
as to contrive them into the world he designed they should compose, (furnished with 
the seminal principles and structures, or models of living creatures) and established 
those rules of motion and that order amongst things corporeal, which we are wont to 
call the laws of nature.  And having told this as to the former, it may be allowed as the
 latter to teach, that the universe being once framed by God, and the laws of motion 
being settled and upheld by his incessant concourse and general providence, the 
phenomena of the world thus constituted are physically produced by the mechanical 
affections of the parts of matter, and that they operate upon one another according to 
mechanical laws.93
Leibniz shares this position with Boyle.  When he opposes those who reject final 
causation in physics, he opposes those who Boyle speaks about.  Gassendi rejects final 
causation in physics.  His position is that God can be inferred from final causes, but it has 
not place in scientific inquiry.94  (Gassendi also holds the position that this mechanistic 
materialism can explain animal husbandry and light.95 This will be a challenge to Leibniz 
when he works out the physics of light in optics.)  Hobbes rejects final causation physics, 
as does Digby.96  
Descartes' Cartesianism is a rejection of Aristotelean physics and a rejection of the 
ancient atomism of Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius.  It explains the behavior of 
bodies not in terms of substantial form, but in terms of size, shape and motion.97  
93 O Toole, p. 296 - 297
94 Clatterbaugh, Kenneth.  The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy, 1637 – 1739.  Routledge:  New 
York, N.Y., p. 84
95 Fisher, Saul.  Perspectives on Science.  “Gassendi's Atomist Account of Generation and Heredity in 
Plants and Animals”, Vol. 11, No. 4, Winter 2003, p. 485
96 Sarasohn quotes Burtt as describing Hobbes' position as “Nothing without us but bodies in motion, 
nothing within us but organic motions”; see Journal of the History of ideas.  “Motion and Morality: 
Pierre Gassendi, Thomas Hobbes and the Mechanical World View”, Vol. 46, July – September 1985, p. 
363 
97 Cottingham, John (Editor).  Cambridge Companion to Descartes.  “Descartes's Physics”, Daniel Garber 
contributor,   Cambridge University Press:  New York, N.Y., 2006, p. 287
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“Descartes rejected the indivisible  atoms and empty spaces that characterized atomistic 
physics.”98  Some Cartesians after Descartes abandoned the causation of Descartes.99  
Legrand, for example,  attributes the cause of motion to the will of God.100  Leibniz in 
Discourse #19 is referring to Descartes himself and not to some later Cartesians like 
LeGrand.  
Leibniz begins this passage with the phrase “Since I do not like to judge people 
wrongly I do not accuse our new philosophers.”  There are two reasons for him opening 
with this statement.  One reason is the kind of person Leibniz was himself, a gentleman 
and appreciator of persons.  The second reason is because of the hostile environment in 
which Descartes, Spinoza, and others who disagree with him think and write.  To be 
accused is dangerous business, not that Leibniz is going to have an actual effect on either 
Descartes or Spinoza personally.   Both of these men have been deceased years before the 
writing of  Discourse on Metaphysics.  Leibniz was simply a gentleman philosopher.  He 
was a diplomat and reconciler of warring factions who  tried to find those parts which he 
could agree with in the other philosopher's opinion.101  
The environment in which Descartes and Spinoza think and write is hostile.  
Toleration for opposing viewpoints in the realm of religion, science, and politics during 
the early modern period is in tenuous.  When Descartes began his career, the papal trial 
and condemnation of Galileo was on his mind.  It can be argued that such pressures, 
98 Garber, Cambridge Companion to Descartes, p. 288
99  Clatterbaugh, p.  9
100 Clatterbaugh, p. 106 – 107 
101 Hobbes is an example of this.  Although Leibniz had strong disagreements with Hobbes, he greatly 
respected the philosopher.  In his 1670 letter Leibniz opens with “To my great delight I recently learned 
from the letters of a friend visiting in England that you are still alive and in full health at so great an age. 
Hence, I could not refrain from writing.  If my doing so is inopportune, you can punish it by silence;  for 
me it will suffice to have given witness of my feeling.  I believe I have read almost all your works, in 
part separately, and in part in the collected edition, and I freely admit that I have profited form them as 
much as from few others in our century.”  see Loemker, p. 105
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whether real or imagined by Descartes, caused him to have those who knew him 
publish The  World posthumously.102  Descartes chafed under the weight of intolerance for 
thinkers such as himself.  He writes in “The Passion of the Soul”, 
...those who believe themselves devout, but are merely bigoted and 
superstitious.  These people who – under the pretext of frequently going
to church, reciting many prayers, and wearing their hair short, fasting, 
and giving alms, - think they are absolutely perfect, and they suppose 
that anything their passion dictates is a commendable zeal, even though it 
sometimes dictates the greatest crimes that men can commit, such as the 
betrayal of cities, the killing of sovereigns, and the extermination of whole
nations for the sole reason that citizens do not accept their opinions.103
Spinoza associates with the Collegiants and Mennonites after his
excommunication, and advocates theological toleration.  He himself, however, was given 
little.  In 1665 he writes to Henry Oldenburg “explaining his reasons for intervening in 
the theologico – political quarrels of his time”.
I am now writing a treatise about my interpretation of scripture:  This I am driven to do for the 
following reasons:
1. The prejudice of the theologians;  for I know that these are among the chief obstacles 
which prevent men from directing their minds to philosophy and to remove them from the 
minds of the more prudent (prudentiorum).
2. The opinion which the common people have of me, who do not cease to accuse me falsely 
of atheism;  am also obliged  to avert this accusation  as far as it is possible to do so.  
3. The freedom of philosophizing, and saying what we think;  this I desire to vindicate in 
every way, for here it is always through the excessive authority and imprudence of the 
preachers.104 
Spinoza never did find general public toleration.  In the autumn of 1676, when Leibniz 
came to visit him, he had reason to think that he might be in danger.  “One of his friends 
had recently been executed, and another had died in prison.”105 
102 Cottingham, John (Editor).  Cambridge Companion to Descartes.  Cambridge Companion to  
Descartes.  Cambridge University Press: New York, N.Y. 2006,, p. 12, “In 1633 he had ready for 
publication a treatise on cosmology and physics, Le Monde (“The World” or “The Universe”),  but he 
cautiously withdrew the work on hearing of the condemnation of Galilee for advocating the heliocentric 
hypothesis (which he too supported).”
103 Levine, Alan.  Early Modern Skepticism and the Origins of Toleration, “Descartes and the Question of 
Toleration” Michael Gillespie, contributor,  Lexington Books: Lanhan, Md., 1999, p.  103
104 Levine, p. 127  “Toleration and Skepticism of Religion in Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus”,  
Steven Smith, contributor
105 Stewart, Matthew.  The Courier and the Heretic, “Leibniz, Spinoza, and the Fate of God in the Modern  
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Both Descartes and Spinoza call for the elimination of final causation from 
physics in their writings.  Descartes, however, clings to a teleological understanding of 
human physiology while Spinoza rejects teleological implications in physics altogether.  
In Meditations on First Philosophy “Part IV” (1641), Descartes says, 
For since I know that my nature is very weak and limited, whereas the nature of God is 
immense, incomprehensible, and infinite, this is sufficient for me also to know that he 
can make innumerable things whose cause escapes me.  For this reason alone the entire 
class of causes which people customarily derive from a thing's 'end', I judge to be utterly 
useless in physics.  It is not without rashness that I think myself capable of inspiring 
into the ends of God.106
In Principles of Philosophy “Part I” (1644 – 1647) Descartes writes in #28, entitled “We 
Must Not Inquire Into The Final, but Only The Efficient Causes of Created Reality”, 
Finally, we will not seek the reason of natural things from the end which God or 
nature has set before himself in their creation and we will entirely banish the 
search for final causes from our philosophy.  For we should not take so much upon
ourselves as to believe that God could take us into his counsels.  But regarding him
as the efficient cause of things, we shall merely try to discover the light of nature
 he has placed in us, applied to those attributes of which he has been willing we 
should have some.  But we must keep in mind what has been said, that we must 
trust this natural light  only so long as nothing contrary to it is revealed by God 
himself.107
In Meditation VI Descartes writes that human beings have sensations “in order to 
preserve the union of the mind and body.”108  This is teleological.  What Descartes objects 
to, therefore, is not finality per se, but certain applications of ends in natural 
philosophy.109
World.  W.W. Norton:  New York, N.Y., 2006, p. 11 
106 Ariew, Roger and Eric Watkins, Readings in Modern Philosophy, Volume I “Descartes, Spinoza,  
Leibniz, and Associated Texts”  Hackett Publishing Co.:  Indianapolis, In.  2000, p. 42;  Martin and 
Brown in G.W. Leibniz:  Discourse on Metaphysics and Related Writings, [p. 9, say, “When Descartes 
and other modernists insist that final causes should not be invoked in natural sciences and that all 
explanation in physics should be in terms of efficient causes, they raised the bogies of mechanism 
materialism and determinism.  The Cartesians, followed Descartes himself, had claimed that animals 
were machines – physical systems whose workings were to be understood in non-purposive terms – and 
others seemed, explicitly or implicitly to extend the analogy in the obvious direction of human beings. 
A major aim of the Discourse was to provide a corrective to such tendencies, as is clear enough from a 
comparison of its contents with the unpublished piece we entitled “Two Sects of Naturalists”.   
107 Ariew and Watkins, p. 86
108 Simmons, Allison, Journal of the History of Philosophy.  “Sensible Ends:  Latent Teleology in 
Descartes's Account of Sensation.”  Vol. 39, No. 1, 2001, pp. 49 – 75 
109 Simmons, p. 49 – 50 
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Descartes speaks of the teleological functioning of human physiology in Treatise 
on Man, Principles of Philosophy IV, The Passions of the Soul, and Meditations VI.110   In 
Meditations VI  Descartes speaks of sensations as being important to human physiology.  
It is his mind – body union, Sensations work toward the goal of survival.  The 'ends' of 
sensation for the human being is survival.111  He says, “...without a doubt sensations are, 
properly speaking, given to me by nature in order to signify to the mind what things 
would be beneficial to or harmful to the composite of which it is part.”112  As mind – body 
unions, human beings have an interest in continued survival.  This requires that the body 
be well maintained;  “if any crucial parts of the body break down, the body is rendered 
defective, the soul departs from it and the human being dies.”113  
The line between Descartes's objection to final causation in physics and his 
teleological use of sensation in human physiology is not clear.  He blurs his metaphysics 
and his natural philosophy.  In his letter to Mersenne he claims that his Meditations 
contains “all the foundation of my physics.”114  In the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes 
connects God's immutability and the physical laws of motion.115
Spinoza says to banish final causes from philosophy and theology altogether.  In 
the appendix of Ethics Part I he says, 
I have thus sufficiently dealt with my first point.  There is no need to spend time in 
going on to show that Nature has no fixed goal and that all final causes are but figments 
of the human imagination.  For I think that this is now quite evident, both from the basic 
causes from which I have traced the origin of this misconception and from Proposition 
16 and the corollaries to proposition 32, and in addition from the whole set of proofs 
I have adduced to show that all things in nature proceed from eternal necessity and with 
supreme perfection.  But I will make this additional point, that this doctrine of final 
Causes turns Nature completely upside down, for it regards as an effect that which is 
110 Simmons, p. 59
111  Simmons, p. 53
112 Simmons, p. 53 – 55 
113 Simmons, p. 56;  (see “Treatise on Man,...Passions I 5-6 and 30...)
114 Simmons, p. 63
115 Simmons, p. 63
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fact a cause, and vice  versa.116
In Korte Verhandeling (1660 – 1661) Spinoza states his doctrine that every 
substance is infinite, and therefore, there is only one substance.  That substance is God.  
Extended and thinking nature are two attributes of the same thing.  Causation is in, not 
external to, the one substance.  “God's providence is redefined as 'nothing but the striving 
we find, both in nature as a whole and in particular things, tending to maintain and 
preserve their being.”117  In such a belief, Spinoza rejects divine providence, and, as a 
result, rejects all teleological implications in causation.
References made by Leibniz at the beginning of Discourse on Metaphysics shed 
light on his critique of Descartes and Spinoza as “new philosophers”.  Leibniz says that 
he refutes an opinion that final causation should be eliminated from philosophy    
altogether.  The opinion he is referring to is that of Descartes and Spinoza.  In Discourse 
#2 he says, “Thus I am far removed from the opinions of others who maintain that there 
are no rules of goodness and perfection in the nature of things or in the ideas God has of 
them and who say that the works of God are good solely for the formal reason that God 
has made them.”118  Leibniz is reacting to a statement in the sixth reply in Objections 
116 Ariew, Roger and Eric Watkins, p. 175
117 Israel, Jonathon.  Radical Enlightenment,:  Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650 – 1750 .  
Oxford University Press:  New York, N.Y., 2001, p. 162
118  Ariew and Garber, p. 36;  Martin and Brown, in G.W. Leibniz:  Discourse on Metaphysics and Related  
Writings, p. 12, says of Leibniz's disagreement with Descartes, “The thought that God observes laws of 
grace make those into eternal truths independent of the will of God and is one point at which Leibniz 
and Descartes are radically opposed.  Descartes was so anxious to assert God's sovereignty that he even 
allowed that the truths of mathematics were created by God's will.  Leibniz – here again following Plato 
– believed not only that the truths of mathematics and logic were eternal truths, but also that there were 
eternal truths of goodness, beauty and justice (Discourse #2).  If, Leibniz contended, the world was good 
because God made it, what basis would there be for praising him?  Descartes' God was not the Christian 
God but an arbitrary despot.  Leibniz, on the contrary, thought that a Christian philosophy would need to 
allow both that there are objective standards of perfection, independent of God's will, and that it is 
possible for us to know whether or not the world conforms to them.  It must, in short, be possible to see 
nature as the handiwork of a perfect God.”  
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(1641).  Descartes, a man admittedly unwilling to debate scriptural exegesis,119 says, 
For it is self-contradictory for the will of God not to have been indifferent from all 
eternity  to everything that has happened or ever will happen, since it is impossible 
to imagine the ideas of anything good and true, anything to be believed or to be done 
or to be left undone being in the divine intellect prior to his will having determined 
itself to bring these things about such as they are.120  
In Discourse #2 Leibniz says further that another opinion by the “recent 
innovators” is troublesome to him.  This is an individual who says that “the beauty of the 
universe and the goodness we attribute to the works of God are but the chimeras of those 
who conceive of God in terms of themselves.”121 This is a reference to Spinoza in the 
Ethics.  In the Ethics Spinoza says, 
When men become convinced that everything that is created is created on their behalf, 
they are bound to consider as the most important quality in every individual thing that 
which was most useful to them, and to regard as of the highest excellence all those 
things by which they were most benefited.  Hence they came to form these abstract
notions to explain the natures of things:  Good, Bad, Order, Confusion, Hot, Cold,
Beauty, Ugliness;  and since they believed that they are free, the following abstract
 notions came into being:  Praise, Blame, Right, Wrong.122
These two statements by Descartes and Spinoza indicate that it is these two “new 
philosophers” whom Leibniz primarily has in mind in Discourse #19 in particular, and 
Discourse on Metaphysics in general.
Leibniz argues that, in response to the challenge by these two men concerning 
God's intended purpose in laws of nature, “we must seek the principle of all existences 
119 Ariew, Roger (Editor).   Rene Descartes, Philosophical Essays and Correspondence.  Hackett 
Publishing Co.: Indianapolis, In., 2000, p. 198;  In his sixth reply Descartes says, “However, as to the 
scriptures passages, I do not think it is my place to answer questions about them, except when they 
appear to be in opposition to some opinion that is unique to me.  For when the scriptures are brought to 
bear against beliefs that are common among all Christians, such as are those which are here being 
attacked, namely, that something can be known and that human souls are not like those of animals, I 
should be fearful of the charge of arrogance if I did not prefer to be satisfied with the replies that have 
already been discovered by others, rather than think up new ones.  For I have never involved myself in 
theological studies except insofar as they contributed to my private instruction, nor do I experience 
within me sufficient divine grace to believe myself called to their sacred studies.”
120 Ariew, Rene Descartes, Philosophical Essays and Correspondence, p. 199
121 Ariew and Garber, p. 36
122 Ariew and Watkins, p. 176
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and laws of nature...”  This admonition by Leibniz carries with it in his mind not only the 
laws of grace which constitute final causation, but also his current work in 1686 on the 
laws of motion and the issue of force.  For Leibniz, the laws of motion and of force fall in 
the category of  final causation, and relate to essential causation within his doctrine of 
“Interpenetration of Causation”.  His work on these physics issues will lead to the “Vis 
Viva” controversy in the 1680s and 1690s.  The two concepts at issue are 
momentum (mv ) and kinetic energy (½ mv2).  These are now being discussed by Leibniz 
and others as a single concept, and they both differ from Newton's force.123  Leibniz's 
concept of force and laws of motion in physics will become part of his teleological 
explanation for the mechanical world.
This is different from his earlier position.  Leibniz began working with physics in 
1669.124  In two presentations to the Royal Society of London in 1671, Hypothesis 
Physica Nova and Theoria Motus Abstracti, Leibniz submits laws of motion in physics.125 
These submissions are purely mechanistic.  Starting in 1676 Leibniz takes force and 
motion in the direction of final causation.  Leibniz's mature position begins with a critique 
and rejection of Descartes quantity of motion. Concerning this Descartes says in 
Principles of Philosophy #36, “It appears obvious to me that this is nothing other than 
God himself, who at the beginning created matter at the same time with motion and rest, 
and who now, solely through his ordinary concurrence, preserves that same amount of 
123 Iltis, Carolyn.  Isis.  “Leibniz and the Vis Viva Controversy”.   Vol. 62., No. 1., Spring, 1971, p. 21; 
Slowik says on page one of his essay “The 'dynamics' of Leibnizian relationism:  Reference frames and 
force in Leibniz's plenum”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, Vol. 37, 2006, “The 
details of Leibniz's physics would suggest to many later commentators the structures implicit in his 
preferred, if not consistently avowed relationalist alternative to Newton's absolute/substantival space: 
these include, most importantly, the restriction of the spacetime invariants to the relative distances, 
velocities, and accelerations manifest among the material occupants of the spacetime.” 
124 Garber, p. 273
125 Garber, p. 273
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motion and rest in that matter as a whole as he placed in it then.”126
The laws of nature require an understanding of Leibniz's teleological usages of 
force and motion in direct opposition to Descartes.  In 1644 Descartes published his 
position on motion in Principia Philosophiae.127  The basic Cartesian view of physics is 
that the nature of body is extension.  Bodies are the objects of geometry made real.  In 
Cartesian mechanism, the properties of bodies are geometrical;  size, shape and 
position.128  According to Descartes, God is responsible for all motion, and “preserves the 
same quantity of motion and rest put into the world at the time of creation.”129  In 
Principia he says, “we must reckon the quantity of motion in two pieces of matter as 
equal if one moves twice as fast as the other, and this in turn is twice as big as the first,” a 
statement the formula of which is mv.130  For Descartes, this conservation by God of the 
same quantity of motion derives from God's perfection, the divine attribute that emits 
from God's unchanging nature.  Because God is unchanging, or constant, the world's 
motion is constant.131
Descartes says that the universe contains an absolute quantity of motion which 
cannot be diminished or destroyed. The conserved quantity is the magnitude of the 
quantity of motion ignoring direction.  It does not conserve its direction.  For Descartes, 
“velocity is always treated as a positive quantity, (v) rather than as a vector quantity 
whose direction is variable.”132  In the same year as Leibniz writes Discourse on 
Metaphysics, he publishes arguments against Descartes saying that “the quantity which 
126 Crowe, Michael.  Mechanics From Aristotle to Einstein.  Green Lion Press:  Santa Fe,  New Mexico, 
2007   p. 95
127 Iltis, p. 21
128 Garber, p. 284
129 Iltis, p. 21
130 Iltis, p. 21
131 Iltis, p. 21
132 Iltis, p. 22
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remains absolute and indestructible in nature is not quantity of motion m(v) but vis viva, 
or living force, mv2.  Beginning in 1686, Leibniz sets out to establish the law of 
conservation of mv2 over m( v).133  
Living force becomes an essential to Leibniz's whole philosophy. In 1686 he 
published “Brevis Demonstratio” in Acta Eruditorum.  In this paper,  he argues that “there 
was a difference between the concepts of motive force (motricis potentiae) and quantity 
of motion m(v) (quantitas motus) and that one can not be estimated by the other.”134 The 
arguments that he makes in this paper show up in Article #17, which contains the same 
diagram as he uses in Acta, and Discourse #18.  In #18 he says, “This consideration, the 
distinction between force and quantity of motion, is rather important, not only in physics 
and mechanics, in order to find the true laws of nature and the rules of motion but also in 
metaphysics  in order to understand the principles better.”135  In the Acta essay he is 
talking about motive force in terms of potential energy and its conversion to kinetic 
energy;  F • s = ½ mv2 .136   Leibniz says, 
Now since it is reasonable that the sum of motive force should be conserved in nature 
and not be diminished – since  we never see force lost by one body without being 
transferred to another – or augmented;  a perpetual motion machine can never be 
successful because no machine, not even the world as whole, can increase its force 
without a new impulse from without.  This let Descartes, who held motive force and 
quantity of motion to be equivalent, to assert that God conserves the same quantity 
of motion in the world.”137
Leibniz makes two points, and he thinks that the Cartesians can agree with both of 
them.138  One, “a body falling from a certain height (altitudine) acquires the same force 
133 Iltis, p. 22
134 Iltis, p. 23
135 Ariew and Garber, p. 51
136 Iltis, p. 23;  On page 23 Iltis says, “In modern terms his proof establishes the idea of the conversion of 
potential energy to kinetic energy, or more generally the basis for the work energy theorum:  F • s = ½ 
mv2.”   The F stands for  force and the s stands for distance.  It is the formula for work.  
137 Loemker, p. 296
138 Iltis, p. 23
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(vis) necessary to lift it back to its original height if its direction were to carry it back and 
if nothing external interfered with it.”139  Two, “The same force is necessary to raise body 
A of 1 pound (libra) to a height of 4 yards (ulnae) as is necessary to raise body B of 4 
pounds to a height of 1 yard.'  In modern terms, the work done on bodies A and B will be 
equal:  Fs = mgs.  From these two assumptions, Leibniz inferred that body A of 1 pound 
in falling a distance s = 4 will acquire the same force as body B of 4 pounds falling 
s = 1”.140
In 1686 Leibniz entered into a debate with the Cartesians over the nature of force. 
In Discourse #21 he comments for the first time concerning the difference between 
motive force, vis viva, and quantity of motion.
If there were nothing in bodies but extended mass,  and nothing in motion but change of 
place, and if everything should and could be deduced solely from the definitions by
geometric necessity, it would follow, as I have elsewhere shown that the smallest body
in colliding with the greatest body at rest, would impart to it its own velocity, without 
losing any of this velocity itself; and it would b e necessary to accept a number of other 
such rules which are entirely contrary to the formation of a system. But the decree of 
the divine wisdom to conserve always the same total force and the same total direction 
has provided for this.141 
For Leibniz, the essence of individual substance  is force and striving.  He disagrees with 
Descartes who believes that motion and extension are the essences of nature.142  Motion 
and extension in the Cartesian viewpoint, for Leibniz, are not real.  In article #18 he 
states, 
If we consider only that what motion contains precisely and formally, that is, change 
of place, motion is not something entirely real, and when  several bodies change 
position among themselves, it is not possible to determine, merely from a 
consideration of these changes, to which body we should attribute motion or rest, 
as I could show geometrically....”143
139 Iltis, p. 23
140 Iltis, p. 24
141 Ariew and Garber, p. 53
142 Iltis, p. 32
143 Ariew and Garber, p. 51
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Leibniz's mature concept of that “law of nature”, force, is spelled out in the same
publication in which he pronounces his doctrine of “Interpenetration of Causation”, 
Specimen Dynamicum.  The physics he worked out before article #19.  The connection 
of force with final causation is indicated in article #18 where he says, “Although all 
the particular phenomena of nature can be explained mathematically or mechanically, by 
those who understand them, nevertheless the general principles of corporeal nature and 
of mechanics itself are more metaphysical then geometrical, and belong to some 
indivisible forms or natures as the causes of appearances, rather than to corporeal mass or 
extension.”144
In Specimen Dynamicum Leibniz distinguishes between two kinds of force, 
primitive and derivative force and active and passive force.145  Active  force is two fold;  
dead force in which motion does not yet exist, and living force with actual motion.  “In 
the context of the physics, vis viva, or “living force”  represents for Leibniz a measure of 
a bodies ability to bring out effects in virtue of its motion.”146  Daniel Garber sums up 
Leibniz's intended purpose and meaning:  
The picture of the physical world that emerges out of the SD and related writings is quite 
interesting for the way in which it joins scholasticism and mechanism.  At the metaphysical 
ground are corporeal substances, unities of form and matter, primitive active and passive 
forces. These, in turn ground derivative forces, the modes or accidents of these primitive 
forces, their momentary states, that can change as do shapes in an extended substance.  The
derivative forces, active and passive, in turn, are the immediate cause of motion, resistance,
 impenetrability, and even extension in bodies, giving rise to the mechanists world of 
extended bodies in motion, following certain laws.  In this way, Leibniz can say, as we have 
seen, that everything in the world happens mechanically, but that the world of the mechanical
 philosophers is grounded in something quite different then extended matter in motion, an 
Aristotelean metaphysics of substantial form and primary matter, it is the dynamics, the science
 of force that links the underlying Aristotelean metaphysics with the physics of the mechanists.  
The final form of this doctrine, with its careful distinction between form and matter, primitive 
144 Ariew and Garber, p. 51 – 52 
145  Garber, p. 290
146 Zalta, Edward n. (Principal Editor).  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  “Leibniz's Philosophy of 
Physics”, Jeffrey McDonough, contributor, http://plato.stanford,edu/archives/spr2009/entries/leibniz-
physics/,Sec. 3.2
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and derivative forces, active and passive forces of different varieties may not appear until the 
1690s; but the basic picture is integral to Leibniz's thought about the physical world  from the 
1680s on.”147  
The meaning behind Leibniz’s words in Discourse #19, “...we must seek the principle of 
all existences and laws of nature...”  should be interpreted in view of Leibniz’s work in 
physics regarding force and laws of motion.  “Living force” and motion are teleological.  
They exist as part of God's plan for his best of all possible worlds.  They are part of 
Leibniz's interpenetration of causation.  They are caused, and they move for an end 
purpose.  After article #19, and the writing of Discourse on Metaphysics, these 
concepts show up in Tentamen Anagogicum (1696) and Theodicy (1710).  
In Tentamen Anagogicum Leibniz says, “The true middle term for satisfying both 
truth and piety is this:  all natural phenomena could be explained mechanically if we 
understood them well enough, but the principles of mechanics themselves cannot be 
explained geometrically, since they depend on more sublime principles which show the 
wisdom of the Author in the order and perfection of his work.”148  In Theodicy he writes, 
I have discovered...that the laws of motion which are actually found in nature, and 
are verified in experience, are not in truth absolutely demonstrable, as a 
geometrical proposition would be.  They do not derive entirely from the principle of 
necessity, but from the principle of perfection and order;  they are an effect of the 
choice and wisdom of God.  I can demonstrate these laws in many ways, but it is 
always necessary to assume something which is not absolutely geometrically
 necessary.149
The reason in article #19 that Leibniz says that “...we must seek the principle of all  
existences and laws of nature...” is “...because God always intends the best and most 
perfect.”  The principle and law of nature that he is referring to is final causality and its 
connection with the perfection and goodness of God.  It is the idea of “best and most 
147 Garber, p. 293
148 Loemker, p. 478
149 Garber, p. 319
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perfect” that creates the Leibnizian controversy regarding evil.  What he means is that 
God has created the best of all possible worlds.  His reasoning is as follows:
(1) For any possible world, there is a better possible world, and so, there is no best 
possible world (assumption).
(2) As omnipotent, God is able to create any possible world He chooses to create.
(3) As omniscient, God knows how to create any possible world.  
(4) As omniscient, God is able to identify the level of perfection of every possible 
world.
(5) As omnibenevolent, (impeccable, all perfect),  God would only choose to create 
the best possible world that he could create.150
For a brief period of time in the 1670s Leibniz, Arnauld, and Malebranche were in 
Paris together at the same time.  Of the various subject matter discussed among them in 
Paris, and the later by correspondence,was the problem of evil.151  Leibniz and
Malebranche believed that God acts like us, rationally and for the sake of that which is 
good.  Arnauld is like Descartes.  God is not a rational person, and the way God acts 
cannot be compared to the way we act.152  Leibniz and Malebranche believed the universe 
to be from the wisdom of God, full of goodness and beauty.  Descartes and Arnauld 
believed the universe to be arbitrary, and the product of an “all-powerful will”.
The event that triggered their discussion, and the discussion about evil in Europe 
in general at that time was the Thirty Years War.  Europe was decimated by years of 
fighting between political rivals, land disputes, and religious differences between 
Catholics and Protestants.  The effects of war, and the dispute between Catholics and 
Protestants, was ended by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.153  Despite this treaty only the 
military conflict between armies ceased.  On the minds of many between the years of 
150 Steinberg, Jesse.  International  Journal for Philosophy of Religion.  “Leibniz, Creation and the Best of 
All Possible Worlds”,  Vol. 62, No. 3, December 2007, p. 123
151 Nadler, Steven.  The Best of All Possible Worlds.  Farrar, Straus and Giroux:  New York, N.Y., p. x
152 Nadler, p. xi
153 Nadler, p. 4 – 5
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1648 – 1686 is the question of the nature of God's interaction with the world.  If he is 
good, then why doesn't God fix evil.  Perhaps he cannot.  Perhaps God does not know 
how.  The “best and most perfect” that Leibniz is talking about is the perfection of 
reality.154  He thinks that the world is both physically and morally superior.155  In Causa 
Dei Leibniz says, “God wills what is good per se, at least antecedently.  He wills in 
general the perfection of all things and particularly the happiness and virtue of all 
intelligent substances;  and he wills each good according to its degree of goodness.”156
154 Rutherford, Donald.  Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature.  Cambridge University Press:  New 
York, N.Y., 1995, p. 46
155 Rutherford, p. 46
156 Rutherford, p. 47
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Chapter Four:  Leibniz Argues in Favor of God's Intelligent Design
After addressing his concerns about the new philosophers, Leibniz proceeds in 
Discourse #19 to confront an erroneous misconception about God's intelligent design of 
the machine.  He writes
I am quite willing to admit that we are subject to deception when we wish to determine 
God's ends of counsels. But this is only when we try to limit them to some particular
design, believing that he had only one thing in view, when instead he regards everything
at the same time. For instance, it is a great mistake to believe that God made the world 
only for us, although it is quite true that he made it in its entirety for us and there is nothing 
in the universe that does not effect us and does also accommodate itself in accordance with 
his regard for us,l following the principles set forth above.  Thus, when we see some good 
effect or perfection occurring or ensuing from God's works, we can say with certainty that 
God proposed it.  For he does nothing by chance and is not like us, who sometimes fail to 
do the good.  That is why, far from about to fall into error in this, as do extreme politicians 
who imagine too much subtlety in the designs of princes or as do commentators who look 
for too much erudition in their author, we cannot attribute too much reflection in this 
infinite wisdom, and there is no subject in which error is to be feared less, provided we 
limit ourselves to affirmations and avoid negative propositions that limit God's designs
Here Leibniz mentions the first of two words which are as politically incorrect and out 
of favor in certain circles in his day as they are today.  One is “design”, which he 
mentions in the above passage, and the other is “intelligent” which comes later in #19.157  
Leibniz's intelligent design positions is that God, a loving person of intelligence, power, 
and will, caused physical reality to come into existence for the end purpose of making 
himself known to other self-aware, intelligent beings, in the personage of Jesus Christ.  
This he makes clear in his Systema and in article #37.  For Leibniz, God's self-
157 Niall Shanks, in the preface to his work God, The Devil and Darwin, “A Critique of Intelligent Design  
Theory”,  Oxford University Press:  New York, N.Y., 2006, says, “A culture war is currently being 
waged  in the United States by religious extremists who hope to turn the clock of science back  to 
midieval times.  The current assault is targeted mainly at educational institutions and science education 
in particular.  However, it is an important fragment of a much larger rejection of the secular, rational, 
democratic ideals of the Enlightenment upon which the United States was founded.  The chief weapon 
in this war is a version  of creation science known as intelligent design theory.” 
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revelation in Christ is why there is something instead of nothing.  For Leibniz, the reason 
the planets revolve around the sun and the reason the natural world exists as it does, is 
for the purpose of such a divine self-revelation.  A few of the Biblical references with 
which he forms his doctrine occur in the gospels where, for example, the angel tells 
Joseph to name the child Jesus, which means “the Lord saves”.158   In his earthly ministry 
Jesus of Nazareth says in Matthew 20:28, “the son of man did not come to be served, but 
to serve and to give his life as a ransom for many.”159   When confronted by religious 
leadership in the Jerusalem temple over the issue of who his father was, the Nazarene 
replies, “Before Abraham was, I am.”160  In this particular response Jesus claims to be the 
burning bush of Moses.  It is a claim to be God on earth.  For this claim, the Bible says he 
was crucified.161  The apostle Paul, writing to the church at Collosae, refers to Christ on 
the cross as the image of God:  “He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn over 
all creation.  For by him all things were created;  things in heaven and on earth, visible 
and invisible, whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities;  all things were created 
by him and for him.  He is before all things, and in him all things hold together.”162
This is the theological understanding Leibniz embraces upon which all logic, 
158 New International Version of the Holy Bible, Matthew 1:21;  Matthew goes on to note  in verses 22 and 
23 that “All this took place to fulfill what the Lord had said through the prophet:  'The virgin will be 
with child and will give birth to a son, and they will call him Emmanuel' – which means 'God with us'.”
159 New International Version of the Holy Bible
160 New International Version of the Holy Bible, John 8:58
161 New International Version of the Holy Bible, John 5:17 – 18 “Jesus said to them, 'My father is always at 
his work to this very day, and I too am working.'  For this reason the Jews tried all the harder to kill him; 
not only was he breaking the sabbath, but he was even calling God his own father, making himself equal 
with God.”  
162 New International Version of the Holy Bible,  Colossians 1:15 – 17 (A.D. 53 – 54, see Muddiman, John. 
The Pauline Epistles.    p. 206 ;  In his book The Crucified God.  Fortress Press:  Minneapolis, Mn., 
1993, p. 27, Jurgen Moltmann says, “The epistemological principle of the theology of the cross can only 
be this dialectical principle;  the deity of God is revealed in the paradox of the cross.  This makes it 
easier to understand what Jesus did;  it was not the devout, but the sinners, and not the righteous but the 
unrighteous who recognized him, because in them he revealed the divine righteousness of grace, and the 
kingdom.” Jesus of Nazareth was God crucified.    
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necessary truths, and scientific formulas are based.  The Father, through the Son, thinks, 
or, rationally expresses himself.  From the mind of the divine craftsman to the physical 
and moral laws of reality, God expresses himself according to that world which is best 
and most perfect.  For Leibniz, conservation of mv2 , the calculus, and other mathematical 
and scientific formulas, emerge from the Father through the Son, and they are used as 
tools upon which the designs of the machine are actualized in terms of necessity and 
contingency.  They are all the working parts of the machine which operates for God's 
glory in the best of all possible worlds.
The arguments written in this passage are in response to Spinoza's Ethics.  
Leibniz's first premiss agrees with opponents of final causes and teleological 
explanations.  He says that, indeed, God's designs are subject to deception: “...we are 
subject to deception when we wish to determine God's ends or counsels.”  The debate 
over final causation and God's “ends' rages before, during, and after Leibniz's lifetime.  In 
the area of meteorology, for example, mechanist philosophers and theologians argue over 
the end purpose for violent weather.  Doubts on all sides were intensified by the fact that 
Aristotle did not mention “ends” in his Meteorology.  Catholics and Protestants were 
divided over the end purpose for storms.  Even the camp which thought that meteorology 
has a divine end disagree over whether the weather is God's providence or wrath.163  
Some thinkers suffer from various deceptive notions like “the ocean was made 
salty so that ships could float in it”, “noses have bridges so as to hold spectacles”, “legs 
are breeched in order to wear breeches”, and “stones were made to be quarried so that the 
Lord could live in a castle”.164  A few years after Leibniz's death, Voltaire expresses the 
163  Martin, Craig.  Journal of the History of Philosophy.  “The Ends of Weather:  Teleology in 
Renaissance Meteorology”,  Vol. 48, No. 3, July 2010, p. 260 – 261 
164 Gordon, Daniel (Editor and Translator).  Candide by Voltaire.  (The Bedford Series in History and 
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outrage over Leibniz's position with this quote from Candide, chapter twenty-eight.
“Well my dear Pangloss”, Candide said, “when you were being hanged, dissected, 
beaten black and blue, and when you were rowing in the galleys, did you still think 
that everything was for the best in this world?”  “I still hold to my original opinion,”
replied Pangloss.  “For after all, I am a philosopher, and it is not appropriate for me 
to take back my word. Leibniz is never mistaken.  Moreover, pre-established harmony 
is the finest aspect of the universe, along with the plenum and subtle matter.”165
David Hume picks up the complaint against intelligent design in the eighteenth century in 
Dialogues on Natural Religion in which Hume criticizes the Newtonian mechanical 
analogy, an argument by proponents in design.166  Bertrand Russel continues the argument 
against design in the twentieth century.  In the “Argument From Design” section of his 
book Why I Am Not A Christian, Russell says to his audience, “You all know the 
argument from design:  everything in the world is made just so that we can manage to live 
in the world, and if the world were ever so different, we could not manage to live in it.  
This is the argument from design.  It sometimes takes on a rather curious form;  for 
instance, it is argued that rabbits have white tails in order to be easy to shoot.”167  Leibniz 
is not referring to retorts against God's ends such as these.  Such thinkers as Hume and 
Russell, Leibniz would argue, suffer from deception of the true nature of the designs of 
God.
When Leibniz mentions the deception nature of determining God's “ends”,  he has 
Descartes and Spinoza in mind.  In Meditation IV Descartes says concerning knowing the 
“ends” of God:
As I mull over these things more carefully, it occurs to me first that there is no reason 
to marvel at the fact that God should bring about certain things the reasons for which 
I do not understand.  Nor is his existence therefore to be doubted because I happen to 
experience other things of which I fail to grasp why and how he made them.  For since
Culture).  Bedford:  New york, N.Y., p. 42
165 Gordon, p. 115
166 For a historical perspective on Hume and intelligent design see Preus, Samuel J.  Explaining Religion. 
Scholars Press: Atlanta, Ga., 1996, p. 85, 89 – 92   
167 Russell, Bertrand.  Why I Am Not A Christian.  George Allen and Unwin Ltd.  1957, p. 9 – 10 
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I know now that my nature is very weak and limited, whereas the nature of God is
immense, incomprehensible, and infinite, this is sufficient for me also to know that he 
can make innumerable things whose causes escape them.  For this reason alone the entire 
class of causes which people customarily derive from a things 'end' I judge to be utterly
useless in physics.  It is not without rashness that I think myself capable of inquiring 
into the ends of God.  168
Descartes does not deny “ends” in terms of God's creative purpose.  He says that he 
simply does not know what the “ends” are.  Does he, however, think that God is 
intelligent in Leibniz's manner? In the dedication section of Meditations on First 
Philosophy (1641),  Descartes  gives indication that he finds contemporary theological 
arguments for the existence of God from the insistence of scripture to be a circular 
argument:
“...it is altogether true that we must believe in God's existence because it is taught in the Holy 
Scriptures, and conversely, that we must believe the holy scriptures because  they have come
from God.  This is because, of course,  since faith is a gift from God, the very same one who 
gives the grace that is necessary for believing the rest can also give the grace to believe that
he exists.  Nonetheless, this reasoning cannot be proposed to unbelievers because they would
judge it to be circular.”169
As to the argument from the design of God in nature being knowable to man, he refers to 
in chapter 13 and Romans chapter one, two documents both of which claim that human 
knowledge of God in nature is knowable.    Nowhere, however, does Descartes ever link 
the words 'God', intelligent', and 'design' in any point or argument.
The second premiss for Leibniz in this passage is that God's designs involve his 
omniscience.  “But this is only when we try to limit them to some particular design, 
believing that he had only one thing in view, when instead he regards everything at the 
same time.” Leibniz believes God is all knowing.  God regards everything at the same 
time while at the same time allowing for freedom in the movement of individual 
substances.  Freedom combined with God's “omniscience” should be understood in terms 
168 Ariew, Roger.  Rene Descartes, Philosophical Essays and Correspondence.  Hackett Publishing Co.: 
Indianapolis, In. 2000, p. 123 – 124 
169Ariew and Watkins, p. 22
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of “possibility” and “freedom”.  God knows all the possibilities that free substances may 
exercise, and in his wisdom, the choices made are what is always best and most perfect.  
The most famous Leibnizian example  of God's omniscience in terms of  his 
intelligent design and his wisdom is Discourse #30 concerning Judas Iscariot.  The Bible 
says three things about the messiah as “Lamb of God”.  One, he had to be betrayed.170  
This is prophesied centuries before the event.171  Two, the betrayer, in this case Judas 
Iscariot, was condemned to hell.172  Three, betrayal was the will of God in advance.  
Therefore, for doing the will of God, Judas Iscariot was condemned to hell.  This is all 
part of the wisdom in the intelligent design of the machine.  The law of efficient cause 
was in play with the motion of Judas in the act, and the law of final cause was  in play in 
the wisdom of God working out the “end” of creation.  The question is did Judas have a 
choice?  Leibniz says yes, because God's omniscience is a knowledge of all the 
possibilities, and not only a knowledge of the future.  He writes, 
“But someone will say, why is it that this man will assuredly commit this sin?  The reply is
 easy:  otherwise he would not be this man.  For God sees from all time that there will be a 
certain Judas whose notion or idea (which God has) contains this free and future action.  
Therefore, only this question remains, why does such a Judas, the traitor, who is merely 
possible in God's idea actually exist?  But no reply to this question is to be expected on earth,
except that, in general, one must say that, since God found it good that he should exist, despite
the sin that God foresaw, it must be that this sin is paid back with interest in the universe, that 
God will derive a greater good from it, and that it will be found that, in sum, the sequence of 
things in which the existence of that sinner is included is the most perfect among all the 
possible sequences.  But we cannot always explain the admirable economy of this choice while 
we are travelers in this world;  it is enough to know it without understanding it.  And here is the 
occasion to recognize the altitudinem divitarum, the  depth and abyss of diviner wisdom, without 
seeking a detail that involves infinite considerations.”173
Leibniz can be further understood in a short essay he wrote sometime in the summer of 
170New International Version of the Holy Bible,  Psalm 41:9
171The forty-first Psalm, “A Psalm of David”, is dated between 1000 – 960 B.C.
172Acts 1:24-25 After the passion of Christ, the eleven disciples decided to choose a successor to Judas 
Iscariot, the betrayer of Christ.  The interpretation of these two verses is interpreted that Judas went to 
hell for his deed.  “Then they prayed, 'Lord, you know everyone's heart. Show us which of these two 
you have chosen to take over this apostolic ministry, which Judas left to go where he belongs.”
173Ariew and Garber, p. 61
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1684 - 1688 entitled The Origin of Contingent Truths”:  “If everything that exists is 
necessary, it would  follow that only those things which exist at some time or other are 
possible (as Hobbes and Spinoza wish), and that matter would take on all possible forms 
(as Descartes wishes).  So no story could be fashioned which did not  exist at some time 
or place which is absurd.”174  
Spinoza believes that all truths are necessary.  God alone is free and determines 
the movements of modes within his being.,  At the beginning of the appendix to Ethics he 
says,
 “I have now explained the nature and properties of God: that he necessarily exists, 
that he is one alone, that he is and acts solely from the necessity of his own nature, 
that he is the free cause of all things and how so that all things are in God and are so 
dependent on him that they can neither be nor be conceived without him, and lastly, 
that all things have been predetermined by God, not from his free will or absolute 
pleasure, but from the absolute nature of God, his infinite power.” 175
Spinoza's theology is a significantly different understanding of God's nature from that of 
Leibniz.  For him, God is not a person with a will to love.  For Spinoza, God is 
omniscient but does not exercise his freedom toward any end purpose.   
Leibniz's third premiss in this passage is that the mistake that leads to deception is 
the limiting of God's design.  He says, “it is a great mistake to believe that God made the 
world only for us, although it is quite true that he made it in its entirety for us and there is  
nothing in the universe that does not effect us and does also accommodate itself in 
accordance with his regard for us...” The idea in Christian theology that reality exists for 
man's end use purposes, that God created the world for us, is found in Genesis 1:26-30.  
The Bible says,
”...let them rule over the fish of the sea  and the birds of the air and over every living 
creature that moves on the ground.'  Then God said, 'I give you every seed bearing
174 Copyright Lloyd Strickland, 2003 – 2011,Leibniz-translations.com
175 Ariew and Watkins, p. 174
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plant on the face of the whole earth and every tree that has fruit with seed in it. They 
will be yours for food.  And to all the beasts of the earth and all the birds of the air 
and all the creatures that move on the ground – everything that has the breath of life
 in it I give every green plant for food.”176 
So, when Leibniz agrees with his critics that God did not make the world “only for us”, 
he neglects to consider that the Bible does not mention creation happening for any other 
beings but mankind.  If he thinks that the world is made for non-human animals, this 
opinion is strictly from natural theology.  It can be argued in the entirety of Leibniz's 
writings that he is a natural philosopher and not a Biblical theologian.  This argument has 
great merit, and this is one of the locations where he demonstrates thus.  Another 
interpretation is that Leibniz is “whipping out a letter” to Arnauld; he simply goes too fast 
and falls into double speak.  The only other way to view the word “entirety” is in relation 
to God's infinite possibilities for the best and most perfect.  That is one way to explain 
“...accommodate itself in accordance with his regard for us....”
 
The words are a reaction to Spinoza in Ethics.  In the appendix to part I, 
Spinoza continues his anti final cause position.
“Now all the prejudices which I intend to mention here turn on this point, the widespread belief
among men that all things in nature are like themselves in acting with an end in view.  Indeed,   
they hold it as certain that God himself directs everything to a fixed end;  for they say that God
has made everything for man's sake and has made man so that he should worship God.  So this
is the first point I shall consider, seeking the reason why most people victims of this prejudice 
and why all are so naturally disposed to accept it. Secondly, I shall demonstrate its falsity;  and 
lastly I shall show how it has been the source of misconceptions about good and bad, right and 
wrong, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like.
However, it is not appropriate here to demonstrate the origin of these misconceptions from the 
nature of the human mind.  It will suffice at this point if I take as my basis what must be 
universally admitted, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that they all 
have a desire to seek their own advantage, a desire of which they are conscious.  From 
this it follows, firstly, that men believe that they are free, precisely because they are 
conscious of their volitions and desires;  yet concerning the causes that have determined 
them to desire and will they do not think, not even dream about, because they are
 ignorant of them. Secondly, men act always with an end in view, to wit, the advantage 
that they seek.  Hence it happens that they are always looking only for the final causes of 
things done, and are satisfied when they find them, having, of course, no reason for further 
doubt.  But if they fail to discover them from some external source, they have no recourse 
but to turn to themselves, and to reflect on what ends would normally determine them to
176 New International Version of the Holy Bible.  Zondervan: Grand Rapids, Mi., 1984
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similar actions, and so they necessarily judge other minds by their own.  Further, since
they find within themselves and outside themselves a considerable number of means 
very convenient for the pursuit of their own advantage – as, for instance, eyes for seeing, 
teeth for chewing,  cereals and living creatures for food, the sun for giving light, the sea
 for breeding fish – the result is that they look on all the things of Nature as means to their own 
advantage.  And realizing that these were found, not produced by them, they come to 
believe that there is someone else who produced means for their use.”177 
Spinoza's objection here is the Biblical position expressed in Genesis.  Spinoza 
rejects  the Biblical record as divinely authoritative.178  His objection to intelligent design 
does not stem from his belief that the existence of God can be questioned.  In fact, in 
Korte Verhandeling he says, “From all this then, it follows clearly that we can prove both 
apriori and a posteriori that God exists.”179  Thus, we see that not only is Spinoza not an 
atheist, but that he is of the opinion that God's existence is provable.  His objection does 
not stem from a belief that God is not the first cause of nature.  Proceeding in the last 
paragraph in chapter one, “That God Exists”, he says, “...things which are proved in the 
latter way (a posteriori), must be proved through their external causes, which is a manifest 
imperfection in them, inasmuch as they cannot make themselves known through 
themselves, but only through external causes.  God, however, who is the first cause of all 
things, and also the cause of himself (causa sui), makes himself known through
himself.”180  Spinoza thinks that God exists and is the first cause of things, putting him in 
agreement with Leibniz regarding essential causes.  Does God think, however, is the 
question.  Does Spinoza think that God is intelligent, and therefore, the essential cause of 
an intelligent design in nature?
177 Ariew and Watkins, p. 174
178 Israel records a comment made by Borch that “at  Rijnsburg there is a Christian who is an apostate Jew, 
in fact, practically an atheist, who does not respect the Old Testament and considers the New Testament 
to be of no more weight than the Koran and Aesops Fables and that, for the rest, this man lives in an 
exemplary and irreproachable fashion, his only occupation being the manufacture of telescopes and 
microscopes.”  See Israel, Radical Enlightenment:  Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, p. 163
179Morgan, Michael (Editor) Shirley, Samuel .  Spinoza Complete Works With Translations by Samuel  
Shirley.  Hackett Publishing Company:  Indianapolis, In., 2002, p. 40 
180Morgan, p. 40
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Spinoza has two sections in Ethics, Propositions #17 and #19,  where he confronts 
the design argument in terms of God's intellect and will.  In Proposition #17 Spinoza 
addresses the intellect of God as it is understood by his opponents.  He does so, however, 
combined with the will of God.   Spinoza says, “God acts solely from the laws of his own 
nature and is constrained by none.”181 He follows this up with two corollaries.  First, 
“there is no cause, except the perfection of his nature, which either extrinsically or 
intrinsically moves God to act.”  Second, “God alone is a free cause.  For God alone 
exists solely from the necessity of his own nature (Pr. 11 and Cor. 1 Pr 14) and acts solely 
from the necessity of his own nature (Pr. 17).  So he alone is a free cause (Def. 7).182  
Nowhere does Spinoza say that God is a thinking person who creates because he is a 
loving person.  Neither does he consider God to be a person of will in the fashion that 
Leibniz does.  He says that “neither intellect nor will pertain to the nature of God.”183  He 
admits that it is the case that his opponents believe that intellect and will belong to the 
nature of God.  He says they believe this because intellect and will are part of the highest 
perfection of themselves.  
The latter part of Proposition #17 is a comparison of divine intellect and will with 
human intellect and will in an attempt to illustrate the faulty reasoning by some that the 
perfection of God exists because of what we see in ourselves. Spinoza argues that  we 
think that God has  because we have plans.  It is a human projection in that we give God 
the attribute of thinking because we see that in ourselves and we consider it to be good. 
Therefore, God thinks.  Spinoza writes, “If intellect and will do indeed pertain to the 
eternal essence of God, one must understand in the case of both these attributes 
181Ariew and Watkins, p. 167
182Ariew and Watkins, p. 166
183Ariew and Watkins, p. 166
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something very different from the meaning widely entertained.”184  First, he says that the 
intellect and will of God is “vastly different” from human intellect and will.185  It has to 
do with order.  He argues, “If intellect does pertain to the divine nature, it cannot, like 
man's intellect, be posterior to (as most thinkers hold) or simultaneous with the objects of 
understanding, since God is prior in causality to all things (Cor. 1 Pr. 16).”  God's 
intellect, insofar as it is conceived as constituting God's essence, is in actual fact the cause 
of things, in respect both to their essence and their existence.”186  
Spinoza's unique position is spelled out next in Proposition #17 in that he thinks 
that “God's intellect, will, and power are one and the same.”187  It differs from Leibniz in 
that, for Leibniz, God is a person of intellect, will, and power.  For Spinoza the essence 
and existence of God are the same, so God is intellect, will and power.  However, he 
argues that  the essence and existence of God is different from what the intellect of God 
causes. Spinoza concludes Ethics  I, #17 with the assertion that, hypothetically speaking, 
God's intellect, “insofar as it is conceived as constituting the divine essence, differs from 
man's intellect both in respect of essence and existence, and cannot agree with it in any 
respect other than in name….”188   
In Proposition #19 Spinoza argues that “Things could not have been produced by 
God in any other way or in any other order than is the case.”189  Everything exists from 
necessity.  He says that if things could have existed in any other way than what it does, it 
would mean that God would have to have another nature, or even multiple natures.  Thus, 
184Ariew and Watkins, p. 167
185Ariew and Watkins, p. 167
186Ariew and Watkins, p. 167
187Ariew and Watkins, p. 167
188Ariew and Watkins, p. 167
189Ariew and Watkins, p. 172 
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there would exist multiple God's, which Spinoza thinks is absurd.190  There is nothing, he 
says that exists as 'contingent', but he says he must explain what he means by contingent 
through an explanation of  what is 'necessary' and 'impossible'.  “A thing is termed 
necessary either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause.”191 A thing is 
impossible “either because its essence or definition involves a contradiction or because 
there is no external cause determined to bring it into existence.”192  A thing is contingent 
because our knowledge is deficient.193  Contingencies occur when we cannot determine if 
there is a contradiction, or, even if we do determine that no contradiction exists, what is 
the cause.  We therefore term it contingent.
Spinoza next turns to the issue of 'will'.  He says that will is not a part of the 
essence of God.  Some, he says, do believe that will is part of an intelligent God creating. 
His argument is the same. If God had a different will, then his nature would have to be 
different.194  Further, if God had a “different intellect in act” and a “different will”, God's 
essence would have been different.  Therefore, Spinoza argues “since things could not 
have been brought into being by God in any other way or order – and it follows from 
God's supreme perfection that this is true – surely we can have no sound reason for 
believing that God did not wish to create all the things that are in his intellect through that 
very same perfection whereby he understands them.”195 
Spinoza's opponents argue that the perfection or imperfection, the  goodness or 
badness of things that exist, depend on the will of God.  Spinoza argues that this is “but 
190Ariew and Watkins, p. 172
191Ariew and Watkins, p. 172
192Ariew and Watkins, p. 172
193Ariew and Watkins, p. 172
194Ariew and Watkins, p. 173
195Ariew and Watkins, p. 173
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an open assertion that God, who necessarily understands that which he wills, can by his 
will bring it about that he should understand things in a way different from the way he 
understands them - and this, as I have just shown, is absurd.”196  He turns their argument 
against them. “For things to be able to be otherwise than they are, God's will, too, would 
necessarily have to be different.  But God's will cannot have to be different (as we have 
just shown most clearly from the considerations of God's perfection).  Therefore, neither 
can things be different.”197
Finally, Spinoza turns to the real reason for his rejection of God as a loving person 
of will who intelligently designs the world.  It is the issue of theodicy.  He says, “I admit 
that this view which subjects everything to some kind of indifferent will of God and 
asserts that everything depends on his pleasure diverges less from the truth than from the 
view of those who hold that God does everything with the good in mind.”198   Spinoza 
cannot abide having a perfect God who causes such a world as this to come into being 
with the good in mind.  A God who creates with the good in mind is subject to fate, and 
this cannot be because, as he has already shown, God is “the first and only free cause of 
both the essence and the existence of things.”199  He eliminates the  theodicy problem 
because God is neither good nor the producer, of anything good.  He argues that this 
reasoning is the imagination of individuals who think that eyes were made for seeing, 
teeth were made for chewing, cereals and living creatures were made for food,  the sun 
was made for giving light, and the sea was made for breeding fish.  A God whose nature 
is without intellect and will cannot be responsible for these things existing for anyone's 
196Ariew and Watkins, p. 173
197Ariew and Watkins, p. 173
198Ariew and Watkins, p. 173
199Ariew and Watkins, p. 174
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benefit.  Leibniz would ask Spinoza, why, then, do they exist.  To the question of why, 
Spinoza has no answer.
Leibniz concludes this portion of Discourse #19 with his statement,    Thus, when 
we see some good effect or perfection occurring or ensuing from God's works, we can say  
with certainty that God had proposed it.”  Here he has divine revelation in mind.  “For 
since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities, his eternal power and divine 
nature have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men 
are without excuse.”200  This is opposite of Spinoza's position.  For Leibniz, God brings 
about creation from his nature which causes God to create only what He thinks is good.    
The greatest good, for Spinoza, is to know God.”201
The “good effect or perfection occurring or ensuing from God's works” refers to 
the actualizing of creation stemming from the “beginning” of creation when God's pre-
established harmony was initially set into motion.  God, who is perfect, chooses what is 
best, and lets the machine play itself out in freedom, and this by design in “the best of all 
possible worlds.  Leibniz's “best of all possible worlds”  allows him to employ his 
“principle of sufficient reason”.  Everything that occurs in the world is necessary, but at 
the same time nothing has to be the way it is.202  According to Leibniz's way of thinking, 
the best of all possible worlds solves the problem of God's goodness.  God does not 
choose particular things.  Neither does he choose things that are evil.  He does, however, 
choose a best of all 203  This is a moral necessity for God, not a metaphysical necessity.  
200New International Version of the Holy Bible, Romans 1:20
201 Ethics IV prop. 28
202Stewart,Matthew.  The Courtier and the Heretic, Leibniz, Spinoza and the Fate of God in the Modern  
World. W.W. Norton and Company:  New York, N,Y., 2006,  p. 238
203Stewart, p. 238 - 239
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God could create a less than best of all possible worlds, or no world at all.204
Leibniz is reacting to Spinoza's concept of the nature of God and his essence, 
existence, and goodness.  These concepts are radically different between Leibniz and 
Spinoza.  Instead of many worlds to choose the best from, Spinoza believes that God 
creates the only world he can possibly create.  It is the one world that follows from its 
own nature.205  For Spinoza, God is immanent, whereas for Leibniz, God is
transcendent.206  As the immanent cause of things, Spinoza's God creates it's world “in the 
same way that the nature of a circle makes it round.”207   Spinoza's God creates it's world 
in the same way that the nature of coffee causes it to be black.208  The circle is in the 
world, and the world is in the circle.    As he is to have said to Blijenburg, “If a triangle 
could speak...it would say that God is immanently triangular.”209  Reality cannot be any 
other way.210  For Leibniz, God creates the world similar to the way a watchmaker makes 
a watch.211
Since Spinoza's God is not a person, it has no personality, therefore God cannot be 
“good'.  In his Treatise, Spinoza says, “Things are good only insofar as they assist a man 
to enjoy the life of the mind.”212 The source of all good is pleasure, which, for him, is the 
maximization of the conatus.213 God is perfect, but morally neutral  Everything in the 
world  follows from God's essence by necessity. In Spinoza's world, there is as much 
evil as there is good.   This is not in an absolute sense, however.  They are relative notions 
204Stewart, p. 239
205Stewart, p. 239
206Stewart, p. 239
207Stewart, p. 239
208Stewart, p. 236
209Stewart, p. 162
210Stewart, p. 239
211 Stewart, p. 248
212Stewart, p. 63
213Stewart, p. 175
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according to how we use the things we are interested in.214  This is born out in his words 
quoted above, that man sees the world as good or evil depending on the results of the end 
uses of things in the world.
In his second argument in this passage, Leibniz starts by saying, “For God does 
nothing by chance, and is not like us, who sometimes fail to do the good.”  Here is 
another place where Leibniz demonstrates that he is not a Biblical theologian.  In 
scripture, chance is part of God's design.  The wisdom writer says, “The race is not to the 
swift or the battle to the strong, nor does food come to the wise or wealth to the brilliant 
or favor to the learned, for time and chance happen to them all.”215 Leibniz's belief is that 
the interpenetration of causation stemming from the pre-established harmony of 
actualized events is not by chance.  Contingent truths exist, but God chooses the best of 
all possible contingencies.  
Sin is failing to do the good.  Leibniz's position is seen in Confessio Philosophi 
(1672 – 73) and Theodicy (1710) where his words mirror Ovid's Medea: “Video meliora 
proboque, deteriora sequor” - “I see the better way and approve it, but I follow the worse 
way.”216  Here he is leaning towards the thinking of Paul in Romans where the apostle 
says “For what I want to do I do not do, but what I hate to do I do”.217  This is because in 
Ovid, Medea is a sinner who knows what is wrong and does it anyway.218  Man the sinner 
fails to do the good whereas God never fails.
Leibniz finishes this section with an observation of those who fall into error with 
214 This is Spinoza's point in the appendix to the Ethics.  Individuals see things as good and bad, right and 
wrong, according to their usefulness in their lives.
215 The New International Version of the Bible, Ecclesiastes 9:11
216 Rutherford, Donald, and J.A. Cover (Editors).  Leibniz, “Nature and Freedom”.  “Video Meliorate 
Probosces, Deteriorate Sequora'”, Jack Davidson, contributor.  Oxford University Press:  New York, 
N.Y., 2005  p. 234
217 New International Version of the Holy Bible,  Romans 7:15
218 Davidson, p. 234
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the intelligent design argument.  He mentions two groups of people, extreme politicians 
who “imagine too much subtlety in the design of princes”, and commentators who “look 
for too much erudition in their author.”  Who are the politicians and who are the 
commentators?    As of today, there is simply no extra-Leibnizian material to indicate who 
he might specifically be referring to.  Unless Leibnizian material currently being 
translated  turns up any new information, scholars will continue to be in the dark as to 
who  such people might have been.
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Chapter Five:  Leibniz Illustrates His Argument
After responding to the new philosophers on the misunderstanding of the designs 
of God, Leibniz turns his efforts to illustrating his argument that physical reality is an 
intelligent design.  He does so three ways.  First, he says that the design of physical 
reality can be seen in animal structure.  Second, it can be seen in the human eye, and 
third it can be seen by the operation of the cannon by the prince.  These three illustrations 
finish the content of Discourse #19, and they all have a common theme, machinery.
He opens the passage by saying, “Anyone who sees the admirable structure of 
animals will find himself forced to recognize the wisdom of the author of things.”  This 
“admirable structure of animals”, as an illustration of intelligent design, is challenging to 
interpreters of Leibniz's idealist ontology.219  Animals are machines.  Machines are 
designs.  The concept of machine is found throughout Leibniz's career.  In a letter to 
Herman Conring (1678), Leibniz links animals with the concept of machines saying,  
“Yet, if I am not mistaken, God could certainly have created a kind of machine similar to 
an animal which carries out, without sensibility, all the functions, or at least most of them, 
which we see in beasts.  Conversely, we cannot assert  with certainty that there is a 
sentient soul in beasts unless we observe phenomena which cannot be explained 
mechanically.”220  In his letter to Walter von Tschirnhaus (1684),. he writes, 
“In Holland they are now disputing, loudly and soundly, whether beasts are machines. 
219 Smith, Justin and Chad Nachtomy (Editors).  Machines of Nature and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz.  
Springer:  New York, N.Y. 2011, p. 1
220 Loemker, p. 190
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People are even amusing themselves by ridiculing the Cartesians for imagining that a 
dog that is clubbed cries in the same way as a bagpipe which is pressed. As for me, 
though I grant the Cartesians that all external actions of beasts can be explained 
mechanically, I nevertheless believe that beasts have some knowledge and that there 
is something in them, not itself extended, which can be called a soul, or if prefer, a 
substantial form....”221 
After Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz mentions the concept of machine in A 
New System of the Nature and Communication of Substances, and of the Union of the 
Soul and Body (1695):
I am the most readily disposed person to do justice to the moderns, yet I find that they
have carried reform too far, among other things, by confusing natural things with artificial 
things, because they have lacked sufficiently grand ideas of the majesty of nature.  They 
think that the difference between natural machines and ours is only the difference between 
great and small.  Recently this led a very able man, the author of the Conversations on the 
Plurality of Worlds, to assert that when we examine nature more closely we find it is less 
admirable than previously thought and more like the workshop of a  craftsman.  I believe
that this conception does not give us a sufficiently just or worthy idea of nature, and that
my system alone allows us to understand the true and immense distance between the least 
productions and mechanisms of divine wisdom, and the greatest masterpieces that derive 
from the craft of a limited mind; this difference is not simply a difference of degree, but a 
difference of kind.”222
For the purposes of a “complete” interpretation of Leibniz in article #19, as well as his 
whole philosophical career, it is important to note that this passage links the machinery of 
nature with the wisdom of God.  The wisdom of God is the law of final cause 
participating in Leibniz's doctrine of “Interpenetration of Causation”.  Machines of nature 
operate for an end purpose.
Three years later in On Nature Itself, Leibniz linked the concept of machine with 
the intelligence of the divine craftsman. “I also agree that those wonders which present 
themselves daily, and about which we customarily say (quite rightly) that the work of 
nature is the work of intelligence, should not be ascribed to certain created intelligences 
endowed with wisdom and power (virtus) only in proportion to the task at hand, but rather 
221Loemker, p. 275
222Ariew and Garber, p. 141
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that the whole of nature is, so to speak, the workmanship of God,...”223  The structure of 
animals, for Leibniz, fits in with his interpenetration of causation between essential and 
final causation.  That is why he mentions animals in #19.  The workings of the animal 
kingdom are according to mechanistic principles.  They also, however, move according to 
the end purpose of creation.  Aristotle argues as much in Parts of Animals 639b5 – 
640a20.  Specifically, in 639b10 he says “The causes concerned in the generation of the 
works of nature are, as we see, more than one.  There is the final cause and there is the 
motor cause.”224  It can be argued that Aristotle in this section, and in parts of Generation 
of Animals, is influential in Leibniz's thinking.
After illustrating design from animal structure, Leibniz turns to the human eye 
and optics.  He says, 
And I advise those who have any feelings of piety and even feelings of true philosophy 
to keep away from the phrases of certain freethinkers225 who say that we see because it 
happens we have eyes and not that eyes were made for seeing.  When one seriously 
holds these opinions ascribing everything to the necessity of matter or to some chance 
(even though both must appear ridiculous to those who understand what we have
explained above), it is difficult to recognize an intelligent226 author of nature. For the 
effect must correspond to its cause; indeed, the effect is best recognized through a 
knowledge of the cause.” 
The freethinkers are those who, like Spinoza, ascribe everything to necessity or chance.  
223 Ariew and Garber, p. 156 
224 McKeon, p. 644
225 Martin and Brown, G.W. Leibniz:  Discourse on Metaphysics and Related Writings, p. 4, say that 
Leibniz was eager to avoid the “free thinker” stereotype.  “For Scholastics the authority of Aristotle had 
a place which was traditionally parallel and subordinate to that of the church.  The Church had insisted 
that its interpretation of scripture could be doubted  only by those who could prove a contrary 
interpretation.  A heavy burden of proof therefore lay with anyone who wished to question ecclesiastical 
authority.  The same was widen taken to apply to intellectual authority generally, and Leibniz made use 
of the notion of paradox that conceded to the Scholastics a good share, of not a monopoly, of authority 
in philosophy.  Someone who ignored the obligation to give well authorized opinion its due is known as 
a 'free thinker', and someone who put forward new opinions regardless was called an innovator, a charge 
that Leibniz (in common with a great many of his contemporaries) was anxious to avoid.”
226 In his Paris notes, written February 11, 1676, Leibniz writes “All possibilities cannot be understood 
distinctly by anyone, for they imply a contradiction.   The most perfect being is that which contains the 
most.  Such a being is capable of ideas and thoughts, for this multiplies the variety of things like a 
mirror.  Hence God is necessarily a thinking being, and if he is not a thinking being, the whole will be 
more perfect than he.”  see Loemker, p. 159
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As Spinoza points out in Ethics, individuals who think that God gave mankind eyes for 
the purpose of seeing  are guilty of the same kind of reasoning that attributes noses for 
holding spectacles.  Leibniz would ask, then why do we have eyes?  The answer given to 
him is the same as today.  No one knows why apart from a metaphysical explanation.  
Mechanistic explanations yield answers directed at the operations of eyesight, but none of 
those explanations offer a compelling reason for the existence of the eye.  For Leibniz, it  
is the like the distance of the earth from the sun.  To the question of why it is nine-three 
million miles away, instead of, say, ninety-two, or ninety-four, answers all concern the 
effects on life's ability to survive.  That, however, does not answer the question of why 
the distance is specifically, and consistently, nine-three million.  It is in response to the 
challenge to final causes in early modern discussions that drives Leibniz to a study of 
optics, and consequently, to one of his most compelling personal discoveries, the 
teleological functions of rays of light and his “Most Determined Path Principle”.
In 1637 Descartes publishes two laws of optics based on geometrical principles, 
the laws of reflection and refraction.227  Descartes' law of refraction says that “the ratio 
between the sine of the angle at which a ray of light strikes a refractive surface and the 
sine of the angle at which it is refracted is a constant determined by the mediums 
involved.”228  Descartes position is that both laws can be derived in an essentially uniform 
manner using purely mechanical principles.229   In 1665 Newton attempts to derive the 
laws from mechanical means, as did Huygens.230  Despite their best efforts, essential 
causation methods to satisfactorily derive the laws of optics seemed to fall  short.  
227McDonough, Jeffrey.  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.  “Leibniz on Natural Teleology and 
the Law of Optics”,  Vol. 78 No. 3,  p. 507
228McDonough, “Leibniz on Natural Teleology and the Law of Optics”, p. 507
229McDonough,“ Leibniz on Natural Teleology and the Law of Optics,  p. 507
230McDonough “Leibniz on Natural Teleology and the Law of Optics,   p. 508 
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Fermat takes up the cause from the angle of final, instead of essential causes.  
This leads him to establish the  position that the key to understanding the paths taken by 
rays of light is not length but direction.  Rays of light always take “the quickest route 
between two given points”.231  With this new principle, Fermat quickly derived 
convincing laws of optics.  To his surprise he discovered that Descartes had discovered 
the laws of optics using a completely different system..232
True to his nature as a professional diplomat, Leibniz tried to reconcile the two 
systems. In the inaugural edition of the Acta Eruditorum (1682), “Leibniz addresses the 
technical difficulties separating the Cartesian and Fermatian approaches as applied to 
cases of refraction.”233  His opening point is that “Light radiating from a point reaches an 
illuminated point by the easiest path, which is to be determined first with respect to planar 
surfaces, but is accommodated to concave and convex surfaces by considering their 
tangent planes.”234  Then Leibniz  makes a statement about the nature of a ray of light that 
he argues is of the nature of final causes and illustrates it with a drawing.  “Hence in 
simple optics, the direct ray of light from the radiating point C to the illuminated point E 
arrives by the shortest direct path – in the same medium of course – that is by the straight 
line CE.”235
231McDonough, “Leibniz on Natural Teleology and the Law of Optics,  p. 509
232McDonough, “Leibniz on Natural Teleology and the Law of Optics, p. 510
233McDonough, Jeffrey. Nous.  “Leibniz's Two Realms Revisited”,   Vol. 42, No.  4, 2008, 
p. 678
234McDonough, Jeffrey K. (Translator) A Unitary Principle of Optics, Catoptrics, and Dioptrics”. 
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rutherford/Leibniz/unitary-principle.htm, p. 1
235McDonough, A Unitary Principle of Optics, Catoptrics, and Dioptrics, p. 1
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Figure 1:  A figure of Leibniz's drawing depicting final causes in a ray of light 236
Line segment CE operates with an end purpose.  It is of the nature of final causes.  
Leibniz argues that “If the lines m and n represent resistance with respect to light – the 
former of air, the latter of water – the difficulty of the path from C to E will be as the 
rectangle formed by CE and m;  from E to G as the rectangle formed by EG and n.  
Therefore so that the difficulty of the path CEG is the least of all, the sum of the 
rectangles CE by m and EG by n should be the least possible, or less than CF by m and 
FG by n – where F is taken to be any point whatsoever except E.  E is sought.”237  He then 
affirms the adequacy of his calculations which have final cause as their base.
236McDonough, A Unitary Principle of Optics, Catoptrics, and Dioptrics, p. 2
237McDonough, A Unitary Principle of Optics, Catoptrics, and Dioptrics, p. 3
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We have therefore reduced all the laws of rays confirmed by experience to pure 
geometry and calculation by applying one principle, taken from final causes if your 
consider the matter correctly:  Indeed a ray setting out from C neither considers how it 
could most easily reach point E or D or G, nor is it directed through itself to these, but 
the Creator of things created light so that from its nature that most beautiful event 
might arise.  And so those who reject final causes in physics with Descartes err 
greatly – not to speak more harshly – since even besides the admiration of divine 
wisdom, they would also supply to us the most beautiful principle for discovering 
some properties of those things whose interior nature is still not so clearly known to 
us that we would be able to use proximate efficient causes and explain the machines 
which the Creator employed in order to produce those effects and in order to obtain
his ends.”238 
His point about the eye in article #19 comes partially from these calculations.  Due to 
the ends with which rays of light move, the eye itself must be the result of the Creator, 
and itself participate in the creators ends. In 1695 he announced to the world his 
fundamental belief which he sought to prove.
In fact (as I have shown by a quite remarkable example of a principle in optics which 
the famous Molybdenum greatly approved of in his Dioptrics), final causes can sometimes 
also be introduced to great effect in particular problems in physics – not only so that we 
can better admire the most beautiful works of the supreme Creator, but also sometimes 
in order to find out things which by consideration only of efficient causes would be less 
obvious, or only hypothetical.239
In Tentamen Anagogicum Leibniz combines his “Most Determined Path 
Principle” with his calculus to produce a more refined argument.  First, Leibniz uses his 
calculus to find “local maxima and minima”.  He asks his readers to consider “a curve 
AB, concave or convex, and an axis ST to which the ordinates of the curve are 
referred.”240“Put in contemporary terms, C is therefore the only point on AB where the 
derivative of the line with respect to ST equals zero.  As an immediate consequence, 
given the equation of the line AB,  one can therefore find the point C by taking the 
derivative of the equation and setting it equal to zero.241”  With this new technique 
238McDonough, A Unitary Principle of Optics, Catoptrics, and Dioptrics, p. 3
239McDonough, “Leibniz on Natural Teleology and the Law of Optics”. p. 516
240McDonough, “Leibniz on Natural Teleology and the Law of Optics”,  p. 512
241McDonough, “Leibniz on Natural Teleology and the Law of Optics”, p. 512
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Leibniz says that derivation of the laws of refraction and reflection is simpler.242  
Next in the article he demonstrates deriving the law of reflection  using the Most
Determined Path Principle and the assistance of calculus.”  “He asks his readers to 
consider a ray of light traveling between the fixed points F and G via a mirror ACB which 
could be plane, concave, or convex:
Figure 2:  A figure of Leibniz's drawing depicting reflection.243
242McDonough, “Leibniz on Natural Teleology and the Law of Optics, “p. 512 – 513  
243McDonough, “Leibniz on Natural Teleology and the Law of Optics,”  p.512;  McDonough, p. 514, gives 
the specific Leibnizian calculations which give a clearer geometrical understanding of what he is doing 
in reflection.  
“HF = HG = a, HB = x, CB = y, CB┴FG, CP┴ACB.  Since CBP is a right triangle, dy = PB/CB. 
Substitutin  y for CB, dy = PB/y.  Multiplying through by y and taking the distance from B to P to be 
negative, -ydy=BP.  Now since CBF is also a right triangle, CF=√((CB)2  + (BF)2). Substituting y for CB 
yields CF = √(y2 + (BF)2).  But BF = a-x, so by substitution, CF=√(y2 + (a – x)2) = √(y2  - 2ax + a2 + x2). 
Similar considerations show that CG = √(y2 + (a + x)2) = √(y2 + 2ax + a2 + x2).  In order to find the path 
FCG = CF + CG which is unique with respect to length, Leibniz differentiates and sets the resulting 
equation equal to zero:  d • CF + d • CG = d • √(y2 – 2ax + a2  + x2) + d • √(y2 + 2ax + a2 + x2) = (ydy + 
xdx – adx)/CF + (ydy + xdx + adx)/CG = 0.  Rearranging terms yields:  CF/CG = (a – x – ydy)dx/(a + x 
+ ydy)dx. Substituting a-x for BF, and a+x for GB in turn yields: CF/CG = BF + BP/GB – BP = PF/PG. 
Trigonometry is now sufficient to show that if CF/CG = PF/PG, then CP bisects FCG, and that the angle 
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He assumes mediums which are homogenous and isotropic. According to McDonough, 
 
Leibniz reduces the problem of finding the unique path with respect to distance times 
resistance to the problem of finding the point C such that the path FCG is unique with
respect to its length.  He then (i) constructs an equation for the length of the path from 
F to G via some point C on ACB, (ii) uses the technique previously illustrated to find 
the value of the equation of the path such that the value is unique or 'stationary', and 
then (iii) uses elementary trigonometry to show that  for such a path the angle of 
incidence FCA must be equal to the angle of reflection GCB.”244 
McDonough says that Leibniz uses the same technique to demonstrate refraction.245  
Consider, he says, a planar, concave, convex surface ACB.  F and G are the source and 
sink points for the ray of light, and the refracted ray is GCF.
Figure 3:  A figure of Leibniz's drawing depicting refraction 
According to McDonough, 
Here Leibniz once again (i) constructs an equation for the path of the ray of
 light – this time taking into account the different resistances of the two mediums, 
(ii) applies his calculus to find the path that is unique with respect to ease (i.e.
of incidence is therefore equal to the angle of reflection.”  
244McDonough, “Leibniz on Natural Teleology and the Law of Optics,” p. 513 – 514 
245McDonough, “Leibniz on Natural Teleology and the Law of Optics, “ p. 514
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length times resistance), and (iii) uses trigonometry to show (a) that the ratio of the sine of 
incidence to the sine of refraction is inversely proportional to the ratio of incident velocity 
to the refractive velocity, and (b) that the ratio between the sine of the angle  at which a 
ray of light strikes a refractive surface and the sine of the angle at which the ray is 
refracted is a constant determined by the mediums involved.”246  
Leibniz thinks that there are many different paths a ray of light can take, and with his 
calculus he is able to select the one path that the ray will take.  With this information he 
strikes as balance between the Cartesians and Fermat.  He is able to solve “non-standard 
cases of reflection”, Fermat's problem , and his standard of “ease” enables him to address 
the Cartesian objection of different speeds of light for different mediums.247  Leibniz's 
claim will be that “from among all the possible paths between a source and a sink, a ray 
of light will travel along the path which is unique with respect to ease;  where “ease is 
understood as the quantity obtained by multiplying the distance of the path by the 
resistance of the medium(s).”248  Now that the obstacles and objections have been 
removed.  Leibniz is able to argue that the laws of optics are not just mechanical, but they 
are also teleological.  There is a utility of final cause in the physics of optics! 
Leibniz finishes this illustration with the words “For the effect must correspond to  
its cause; indeed, the effect is best recognized through a knowledge of the cause.”  These 
words come in response to Spinoza's position on cause and effect.  Their foundation lies 
in Leibniz's knowledge of Aristotle and his cosmological argument.  Aristotle argues that 
246McDonough, “Leibniz on Natural Teleology and the Law of Optics”  p. 514 – 515; McDonough, p. 515 
gives the specific Leibnizian calculations which give a clearer geometrical understanding of what he is 
doing in refraction.  “HF = HG = a, HB = x, CB = y, CB┴FG, CP ┴ ACB.  As before, FCG = CF + CG 
= √(y2 + (a – x)2) + √(y2  + (a+x)2) =  √(y2 - 2ax +a2  + x2) + √(y2 + 2ax +a2 +x2.  Taking the resistance of 
the upper medium to the lower medium to be as f to g, then the measure of the ease of the path FCG = f 
• CF + g • CG = f • √(y2 – 2ax + a2  + x2) + g • √(y2  + 2ax a2 + x2).  In order to find the path FCG = CF + 
CG which is unique with respect to its ease (i.e. distance times length), Leibniz once again differentiates 
and sets the resulting equation equal to zero:  f(d • CF) + g(d • CG) = f(d • √ (y2  - 2ax + a2 + x2)) + g (d • 
√(y2 + 2ax + a2 + x2)) = f • (ydy + xdx – adx)/CF +g • (ydy + xdx +  adx)/CG = 0.  Calculating as above, 
yields:  CF/CG = (f • PF)/ (g • PG).  Trigonometry is now sufficient to complete the proof.”
247McDonough, “ Leibniz on Natural Teleology and the law of Optics”, p. 516
248McDonough, p. 512
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for the existence of an “unmoved mover” which causes it all initially, and also that for 
every effect there must be a cause.249  The passage regarding the relation between cause 
and effect which most likely has an influence on Leibniz is found in Posterior Analytics 
I 2 10-20 where Aristotle says, 
“We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as 
opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we 
think that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact 
and of no other, and, further, that the fact could not be other than it is....What I
now assert is that at all events we do know by demonstrations.  By demonstration 
I mean a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge, a syllogism, that is, the
grasp of which is eo ipso such knowledge.  Assuming then that my thesis as to 
the nature of scientific knowledge is correct, the premisses of demonstrated 
knowledge must be true, primary, immediate, better known than and prior to the 
conclusion which is further related to them as effect to cause.”250
Aristotle's other comment which influences Leibniz is Metaphysics II 2 994a 16-19:  “But 
of series which are infinite in this way, and of the infinite in general, all the parts down to 
that now present are alike intermediates; so that if there is no first there is no cause at 
all.”251 
In 1676 Leibniz annotates Spinoza's Letter 12.  This Spinozan work is a comment 
on Chasdai Crescas's cosmological argument for the existence of God in Or Adonai.   
Crescas argues that “if the cosmological proof is to have any validity, it cannot appeal to 
an alleged absurdity of an infinite regress, but must take a different form.  In Letter 12, 
Spinoza summarizes Crescas's argument and the current debate with this statement:
But in passing  I should like to note that the more recent Peripatetics have, as I think, 
misunderstood the demonstration by which the ancients tried to prove God's existence.  
For as I find it in a certain Jew, called Rab Chasdai, it runs as follows:  if there is an 
infinite regress of causes, then all things that are will also have been caused;  but it does 
not pertain to anything which has been caused to exist necessarily by its own nature; 
therefore, there is nothing in nature to whose essence it pertains to exist necessarily;  
but the latter is absurd; therefore, the former also.  Hence, the form of this argument 
does not lie in the impossibility of there being an actual infinite, or an infinite regress
249 McKeon,  p. 878 
250McKeon,  p. 111 – 112;  see also Mancosu, Paolo.  Philosophy of Mathematics and Mathematical  
Practice in the Seventeenth Century.   Oxford University Press:  New York, N.Y., 1996, p. 10-11
251McKeon, p. 713;  see Mogens p. 60
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of causes, but only in the supposition that things which do not exist necessarily by 
their own nature are not determined to exist by a thing that does necessarily exist by 
its own nature (NS:  and which is a cause, not something caused)”.252 
Spinoza does not believe in a first cause.  He says, “God cannot properly be called the 
remote cause of singular things...For by a remote cause we understand one which is not 
conjoined in any way with its effect.  But all things that are, are in God, and so depend on 
God that they can neither be nor be conceived without him.”253  Crescas thinks that 
necessary existence can only come from an uncaused being.254  This is not Spinoza's 
position.  He says in his Short Treatise,  “God, the first cause of all things, and also the 
cause of himself, makes himself known through himself.  So what Thomas Aquinas 
says, that God could not be proved a priori because he properly speaking has no cause- is 
not of much importance.”255  Spinoza thinks that God is an uncaused thing, as does 
Crescas, and God is the first cause of all things in the sense that “divine self-causation 
constitutes the common ontological ground of all finite things or causes.”256  
Leibniz agrees with Spinoza on  the infinite.  In his letter to Foucher (1693) he 
says, “I am so much in favor of the actual infinite, that instead of admitting that nature 
rejects it, as is commonly said, I maintain that it effects it everywhere, for better 
indicating the perfection of its author.”257  Leibniz sees his own principle of sufficient 
reason in Spinoza's analysis of Crescas's argument:
“This is is rightly observed, and agrees with what I am accustomed to saying, that
nothing exists but that for whose existence a sufficient reason can be provided...From 
these considerations a truly memorable thing also follows, that what is earlier in the 
series of causes is not nearer to the Reason for the universe,i.e. to the first being , 
than what is later, nor is the First being the reason for the later ones as a result of 
252 Laerke, Mogens.  Archiv fur Geschichte Der Philosophie.  “Leibniz's Cosmological Argument for the 
Existence of God.'  Vol. 93, No. 1, March 2011, p. 60
253 Laerke, , p. 60
254 Laerke, p. 61
255 Laerke, p. 61
256 Laerke, p. 61
257 Laerke, p. 63
71
the mediation of the earlier ones;  rather, it is  the reason for all of them equally 
immediatley.”258
When Leibniz talks about cause and effect in article #19, he is by no means 
talking about a first cause and later causes and effect in terms of priority.  For Leibniz, 
there is no priority in cause and effect.  Further, for Leibniz there is no cause and effect 
between finite substances at all.  His thinking along these lines can be established from 
the 1670s.  In Demonstratio propositionum primarum, Confessio philosophi,  for 
example, Leibniz speaks of the principle of sufficient reason in terms of 'requisites'.  The 
principle of sufficient reason of any one particular thing is the sum of its requisites.  “If 
we correlate this view with the comments in Letter 12, it suggests that, in Leibniz's view, 
instead of seeing Leibniz as the 'first term' in the series of things, we must see him as the 
being that contains the requisites for the existence of all things.”259  In his letter to 
Tschirnhaus concerning Ethics, Leibniz says, “God is the one all (unus omnia);  for in him 
are contained the requisites for existing of all the others.”260
What does Leibniz mean by 'requisites'?  The ingredients for Leibnizian causation 
are “order and consequence”.261  He specifies between  “conditions that are absolute and 
those that are relative to 'a certain mode of producing or existing'.”262 Absolute conditions 
are inferences from the conditioned to the condition.  This is “immediate and without the 
need of additional premises.”263  An example would be a circle and the plane it is drawn 
on.  The plane is a condition of a circle.264  Sufficient conditions, for Leibniz are 
258 Laerke, p. 63 – 64 
259 Laerke, p. 63 – 64 
260 Laerke, p. 64
261Futch, Michael.  British Journal of Philosophy of Science.  “Leibnizian Causation”,  Vol. 56 (2005, p. 
452
262Futch, p. 453
263Futch, p. 453
264Futch, p. 453
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principles.  Causes are 'producers', principles or conditions prior by nature.  These are 
called requisites.265  In Leibniz literature, this information is used to produce four 
possibilities for what a cause is.  
1. A cause is an immediate requisite, and thus a condition that is absolutely 
necessary for the existence of its effect.
2. A cause is a mediate requisite, and thus a condition that is necessary for it's 
effect relative to a specified mode of existing.
3. A cause is an immediate producer, and thus a condition that is sufficient 
for the existence of its effect.
4. A cause is a mediate producer, and thus a condition that is sufficient for its 
effect relative to a specified mode of existing.266
In the middle period, causes, for Leibniz are only “mediateley related to their effects.”267  
He says, “requisites of things are mediate, which through reason must be investigated, 
such as causes.”268  For Leibniz, “causes do not relate to their effects as parts of 
wholes.”269  He identifies causes with requisites.270  A cause is a “necessary condition that 
is related to its effect through the mediation of some law, rule or 'mode of producing'.”271  
It is “a factor that contributes significantly to an actual effect by being a sufficient 
condition for something that is, under a certain hypothesis, a necessary condition for the 
occurrence of the effect.”272
The third illustration Leibniz uses is the prince and the cannon.  At the end of 
Discourse #19 he says, 
Moreover, it is unreasonable to introduce a supreme intelligence as orderer of things 
and then, instead of using his wisdom, use only the properties of matter to explain the 
phenomena.  This is as if, in order to account for the conquest of an important place by a 
265Futch, p. 455
266Futch, p. 456
267Futch, p. 458
268Futch, p. 458
269Futch, p. 458
270Futch, p. 458
271Futch, p. 458
272Rutherford, Donald.  Leibniz and The Rational Order of Nature.  Cambridge University Press:  New 
York, N.Y. 1995  p. 115
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young prince a historian were to claim that it occurred because the small particles of \
gunpowder, set off by the contact of a spark, escaped with sufficient speed to push a 
hard and heavy ball against the walls of the place, while the little particles that make 
up the brass of the cannon were so firmly interlaced that this speed did not separate 
them, instead of showing how the foresight of the conqueror enabled him to choose
the suitable means and times and how his power overcame all obstacles. 
  
Order in causation is important for Leibniz.  An intelligent design is an ordered 
design.  Leibniz says, “Order is the relation of several things, through which any one of 
them can be distinguished from any other.”273  It is a “species of relation” in which things 
are related to each other.274 Order is of two types, situs, which is the order of arranged 
parts or constituents, and the order which occurs “in a series or progression of things.”275  
Disposition and arrangement are essential components of complex beings.  He says in 
Cum Deo, “Since everything which exists or which can be thought must be compounded 
of parts, either real or conceptual,' there are two ways in which differences of kind can 
arise:  either through a difference of parts or through a different arrangement of parts.”276  
Priority and posteriority determine order of succession.277
In 1687, Leibniz pens eight definitions concerning order.
(D1) If A is, then B is = A is an inferens, B is an illatum.
(D2) If A is not, then B is not = A is a conditio, B is a conditionatum,
(D3) A is prior by nature if its notion is simpler.
(D4) If A is not, then B is not, and if A is prior by nature to B = A is a requisitum, B 
is a requirens.
(D5) A producens is an inferens that is prior by nature, or at least what is in itself 
an inferens (i.e., if nothing impedes it) prior by nature.
(D6) A relevens is what renders a relevatum easier, or that which is a requisite on a 
certain hypothesis or according to certain circumstances and a certain mode of 
existing or producing.”  
(D7) A conferens is a producens of a relevans
(D8) A cause is a conferens  with outcome (cum successu), i.e. the producens of a 
requisite, on the hyposthesis or according to the mode of existing by which a 
273Rutherford, p. 111
274Rutherford, p. 111
275Rutherford, p. 111
276Rutherford, p. 111, L, p. 80
277Rutherford, p. 111
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thing in fact exists.”278
In (D1) A is “a sufficient condition for the existence of B”.  In (D2) the existence of A is a 
necessary condition for the existence of B.  In (D3) one thing can be prior to another.  
Leibniz says that that which is former is simpler.  (D4) concerns the difference in 
requisites, which is important for all of Leibnizian metaphysics.  In 1685 he says, “Some 
requisita of things are mediate which must be investigated through reasoning like causes; 
others are immediate like parts, limits and generally those things which are in (insunt) a 
thing”.279  An immediate requisite is presupposed by another being and cannot exist 
without it.280  (D5) stands in relation to (D1) as (D4) stands to (D2), “a producens, 
according to Leibniz,  is an inferens  that is also prior by nature.”281  “(D6) next defines an 
example of a requisitum mediatum:  a relevans, which is a requisitum  'on a certain 
hypothesis or according to certain circumstances and a certain mode of existing or 
producing.”282 In this state of contingency things existing in one state are not 
“a necessary condition per se for the existence of another thing, but only a necessary 
condition 'on a certain hypothesis'.”283 
 According to Rutherford, (D7) and (D8) are substituted for by Leibniz with the 
following:
(D7') A conferens is a requisitum according to some mode by which a 
thing could be produced. (D8') A cause is a requisitum according to 
that mode by which a thing has been produced.  I prefer to call it an 
efficens”.”284 Content wise, (D7') is the same as (D6), “Leibniz's 
definition of a relevans.  This redefines a conferens as “a necessary 
278Rutherford, p. 112
279Rutherford, p. 113
280Rutherford, p. 113
281Rutherford,  p. 113
282Rutherford,  p. 113
283Rutherford,  p. 113
284Rutherford,  p. 114
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condition for the existence of a thing according to some mode by 
which it could be produced.”285  Cause is redefined by (D8').  It is 
now “a special case of a conferens, namely a necessary condition 
according to the mode by which a thing has in fact come into existence.”286
Leibniz gives an example of his meaning in Vorausedition zur Reihe VI, 
where he says, “We say that a teacher contributes to the fact that human beings are happy, 
since he produces something that is necessary, namely knowledge from one experienced 
in some of the things necessary for happiness.  However, the contributing  (conferens) 
itself is not immediately requisitum.    For to stay with the same example, we can learn 
the same things even without a teacher.”287  According to Rutherford, Leibniz  does not 
think that (D7') and (D8') “articulate an adequate definition of 'cause' since in limiting a 
cause to a necessary condition, they rule out those things, such as the teacher's 
instructions, which may in fact be effective in bringing about a certain outcome but are 
not necessary for it.”288  “For this reason, he prefers to define a conferens, or contributing 
factor, more broadly as that which is sufficient for a requisite  (or necessary condition) 
under a certain set of circumstances, and a causal as a conferees,  which contributes to an 
effect that in fact occurs.”289  
Leibniz says that there is wisdom in the order of things.  That is why he chides 
those who introduce an intelligent author as creator of things, then turn around and 
attribute everything in causation to matter.  His reaction to Spinoza’s determinism drives 
him to begin including the wisdom of God  and what is best in the mechanics of nature.290 
285Rutherford,  p. 114
286Rutherford,  p. 114
287Rutherford,  p. 114 see V on p. xiii  “G.W. Leibniz, Vorausedition zur Reihe VI (Philosophische  
Schriften) in der Ausgabe der Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR.  Ed. Leibniz-Forschungsstelle der 
Universitat Munster.  10 Vols., with successive pagination.  Munster, 1982 – 91.
288Rutherford,  p. 114
289Rutherford,  p. 114
290Garber, Daniel.  Leibniz:  Body, Substance, Monad.  Oxford University Press:  New York:  N.Y., 2009 
p. 233
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In his Conversation du Marquis de Pianist...,et dew Pete Emery Eremite (1679-1681) 
Leibniz says, 
There are two extremes to avoid when dealing with the laws of the universe.  Some believe that 
everything happens with a mechanistic necessity, as in a watch;  others are persuaded that the 
sovereignty of God consists in a freedom without rule.  The proper middle position is consider God
 not only as the first principle, and not only as a free agent, but to recognize in addition  that his 
freedom is determined by his wisdom....When one has this idea of God, one can love him and 
honor him.291 
So Leibniz ends Discourse #19 with a final example from machinery, the prince and the 
cannon, which appropriately illustrates the doctrine of interpenetration of causation.  In 
order to consider seriously Spinoza’s determinism, one has to think that the cannon loads 
itself, aims itself, and fires by itself.  The Leibniz says is not real.  There is no mind 
behind the action.
291 Garber, Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad, p. 233
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Conclusion
My purpose in writing this essay was to comment on article #19 of Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz's Discourse On Metaphysics.  In doing so, I have operated under the 
thesis that a proper interpretation of article #19 involves the context in which it is 
written, opposing philosophical viewpoints to Leibniz, and three Leibniz themes; final 
cause, intelligent design, and machinery.    A study of this article leads one to an 
investigation of those philosophical questions and issues which represent the core of 
Leibniz's philosophy as a whole.  They mirror his thinking in their words.  
Leibniz believes that reality is a machine that operates according to two sets of 
laws, mechanical laws of motion represented in essential causation and teleological laws 
of grace represented by final causation.  The machine is created by a loving person of 
intelligence, will, and power.  The machine is preserved in its operation by this same 
person.  This person is the God of Judeo/Christian belief and heritage.  Leibniz believes 
that God created the machine according to mathematical, scientific,and logical truths, and 
that it functions on its own according to those principles.  Equally as well, he believes 
that this same physical machine operates for an “end purpose”.  The substances which 
make up the physical machine, like rays of light, move for a reason.  Nothing, Leibniz 
says, moves by accident or chance.
Leibniz believes that every physical entity has mind.  Souls with mind possess 
earthly bodies and move freely towards an end  in this best of all possible worlds.  This 
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end is a meeting with God in the personage of Jesus Christ.  The reason that there is 
something instead of nothing, ie.  the reason for creation, is so that God can establish 
eternal relationships with individual souls who love him in return. 
Article #19 is about the utility of final causes in physics.  Leibniz makes this 
argument because of the “new philosophy” which sought to eliminate final causes from 
the sciences in the early modern period..  Most likely, the new philosophy was 
Cartesianism  and those in its belief system who sought to eliminate final causes from the 
sciences and physics.  Descartes and Spinoza, the two main philosophers of Leibniz's 
objection in #19,  represented such opinions.  They, along with those atomists who also 
sought to eliminate final causes, are the new philosophers who serve as those he is 
thinking about in #19.  Leibniz's understanding of final causation is a combination of 
Aristotelian and Christian theology which produces in Leibniz's thought a method for 
understanding reality that surpasses what mere essential causation and its mechanism 
could produce.  After abandoning substantial forms for mechanism early on, he comes to 
realize that not everything can be explained through essential causes.  With only 
mechanism at his disposal, Leibniz finds that he cannot answer the “why” of anything. 
Therefore, Leibniz embraces final causation.  A study of Leibniz's career from beginning 
to end is a study in a philosopher who sought to explain “why”, and not just “how”, 
physical reality operates through the employment of both essential and final causation.
The challenge of Descartes is that his banishing of the search for final causes in 
physics leaves him with no explanation as to why anything moves or exists as it does.    
By wanting to banish the search for final causes, Descartes is saying that final causes do 
exist, i.e. physical reality does move with a purpose, but he simply does not know what 
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the purpose is.  Descartes wants to banish the search for final causes, and he finds final 
causes in physics to be utterly useless, but never he never states that there are no final 
causes at all.  Descartes believes that the attributes of God make God incomprehensible 
and his ways beyond understanding.  He therefore does philosophy apart from the 
understanding of the ends of God in both the Bible and Catholic theology, a theology 
which is built upon the Bible and the church fathers.  As a result, his philosophy does not 
undergird Christian theology, either Biblical or Catholic.  Rather, it leads to the single 
substance atheism of which Spinoza is accused.
Spinoza takes Descartes' single substance idea seriously and adopts it as the 
cornerstone of his philosophy.  There is, and there can only be, one substance.    This 
make him a pantheist and an atheist by the definition of seventeenth century atheism, 
which is denial in the Christian God.  Spinoza shares Descartes' problem of not being able 
to explain the why of anything.  He is the opposite of Leibniz.  God is not a person. God 
does not think, has no will, and does not care.  It is fallacious reasoning, Spinoza believes, 
to think otherwise about God.  God is in all of nature, and all of nature are just attributes 
and modes of the one substance.  He believes that physical reality occurs necessarily out 
of God's nature.  There is no end purpose for which the world moves.  This sets him at 
odds with the Christian public who find him to be near the devil incarnate. 
Article #19 is part of Leibniz's attempt at reconciliation between  Catholics and 
Protestants.  It's contents are very appropriate for this cause, but it is a lost cause.  Leibniz 
has severely overestimated his capabilities.   One thing that these two parties can agree
on, however, is that the world moves for an end purpose. Further, Catholics and 
Protestants alike think that it is rational to think so.  For these reasons Leibniz's design 
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argument is highly appealing to both groups.  Leibniz's problem is that he sends an 
outstanding peace of philosophical literature to a person who is probably the wrong 
Catholic to send it to.  Though Arnauld is a tremendous thinker in his own right, his 
Jansenism puts him in too partisan a position within Catholicism.  Leibniz should have 
sent a complete copy of Discourse on Metaphysics, along with its partner work 
Systema Theologicum, to a Catholic official more acceptable to the Roman Church at 
large.  
To study article #19, one must confront Leibniz's intelligent design argument 
which involves Leibniz's protestant theology as well.  If one is not willing to do this, one 
ultimately cannot comprehend Leibniz.  The interpreter is left with half an understanding, 
which is exactly what Leibniz was trying to avoid.  An intellectually honest approach to 
Leibniz, which, in this day and time is admittedly politically incorrect, requires a grasp of 
how everything for this thinker comes down to the two laws of essential and final 
causation working together in harmony.    To understand Leibniz is to understand The 
Doctrine of Interpenetration of Causation.  The math, logic, physics, science, and 
theology of Leibniz are all involved in this doctrine.  His monads even work according to 
both sets of laws.
A popular concept in the early modern period is “machine”.  Descartes used the 
term in reference to animals. If Leibniz would have known about the combustion engine, 
he would have said that reality is a machine with a two cylinder engine.  It is designed by 
God and operates according to two sets of laws.  He illustrates his design concept in #19 
with three examples of the machine;  animal structure, optics, and the prince and the 
cannon.  Animals are structured as they are because they are supposed to be.  The cheetah 
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runs fast and the tortoise runs slow because they are supposed to.  Otherwise, the cheetah 
would run slow and the tortoise would run fast.  It is the way the great architect designed 
them to be.  This is #19, an example  of rationality from the principle of sufficient reason. 
The most convincing design argument proof in #19 is his mentioning of the 
human eye.  One could argue that  his line of thinking is too similar to the fallacious 
argument that oceans were made salty so that ships would float in them.  Spinoza must be 
right.  It just happens that we see because it happens that we have eyes.  Leibniz's attack 
in #19 is on the issue of random chance.  Eyes do not exist by random chance, and the 
most determined path taken by rays of light proves this.  Of the infinite possible paths 
light rays can travel, they always take the easiest path.  This, Leibniz concludes, is no 
accident or chance occurrence.  To him, this is evidence that an intelligence is guiding the 
machine.  Therefore, Spinoza is wrong, eyes were made for seeing.
In his last illustration, he seeks to link the loving person God with the operation of 
the machine in the story of the prince and the cannon.  Simply put, cannons do not 
construct, load, or fire themselves.  They must be constructed, loaded, and fired by an 
outside agent.  The prince is the outside agent, a person of intelligence and will, who by 
his power successfully conquers the castle.  In Leibniz's thinking, this same principle is 
true of all reality, from the human eye to the structure of animals to the actions of souls 
who might love God in return.  Leibniz says that this is all God wants.  He has designed a 
best of all possible worlds, pre-established from the beginning, to run on two sets of laws, 
one mechanical and one teleological, so that intelligent souls might recognize him when 
they see him and thereby love him.  Discourse on Metaphysics #19 is part this Leibnizian 
rationale.
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